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Abstract 
Commercial banks are becoming the new actors in the world of microfinance now that 
repressive financial market policies have been dismantled in many developing countries. This study 
documents and discusses the major issues banks must confront to provide microlending services to 
low income clienteles. The recent experiences of eighteen banks are investigated in terms of new 
products and financial technologies, and organizational structure and regulation. Their institutional 
performance in outreach and sustainability is also highlighted from interviews with bank officers. 
Lessons from these experiences are summarized along with recommendations to the donor 
community to facilitate these new initiatives . 
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CHAPTER ONE: OVERVIEW 
I. Introduction 
This is one of the first reports written about the role of commercial banks in microfinance. The 
reason is simple: there has been little to tell because commercial banks have been so notably absent 
in this field. In their absence, microenterprise lending has developed on an alternative track through 
a large number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other specialized financial 
institutions. Dedicated to improving the lot of the poor in developing countries, these micro lending 
NGOs first entered the microenterprise field in the 1980s, responding to the critical income and 
employment opportunities of their urban and rural clientele. Today some leading NGOs have created 
financial technologies that serve increasing numbers of the poor, generate repayment rates that 
compare favorably to many traditional commercial banks' own loan performance, and have achieved 
increasing levels of sustainability, even to the point of outright profits without subsidies (Christen, 
Rhyne, Vogel, and McKean). 
Nevertheless, the majority of NGOs have encountered serious problems of sustainability. This 
suggests there may be serious flaws in the NGO approach that need to be acknowledged. These 
appear to emerge from their organizational design; i.e., property rights and governance structures, 
features that are generally strengths in commercial banks. At the same time, NGOs usually are not 
responding to the widespread demand for deposit services from their clienteles, a demand effectively 
serviced by banks. Finally, it should be noted that the most successful, pathbreaking NGOs, two of 
which are investigated in this study, are currently transforming themselves into regulated financial 
intermediaries that incorporate deposit services as a growing part of their services. 
A surprising number of commercial banks in developing countries are now beginning to examine 
the microfinance market. Stiff banking competition in many countries has forced some to diversify 
into new markets. Some seek a new public image. Others have heard about the profits of successful 
microenterprise banks in Indonesia and financial NGOs-turned-banks in other countries. Over the 
last five years, their exploration of this new market has been facilitated by donor-funded loan 
guarantees, central-bank rediscount lines, and specialized technical assistance. Although the initial 
funds for loans frequently came through donor intermediated sources, commercial banks in time 
began to draw upon their own deposit sources for a growing share of their total funds for microloans. 
While traditional commercial banks and finance companies are beginning to look at ways to service 
the large number of potential clients for small loans, many microenterprise lending NGOs with heavy 
case loads have begun to scale-up operations by transforming themselves into regulated banks or 
specialized financial institutions offering microdeposit facilities as well as microloans. The new 
NGOs-turned-banks and the traditional banks are beginning to converge on a single potentially 
profitable market but from two sharply contrasting financial worlds. 
NGO and bank operations, however, hardly begin to cover the demand for microfinancial services. 
NGO programs are generally minuscule in each country, and the banking sector is still by and large 
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just initiating its entry into this market niche, although in some countries banks are already larger 
providers of loans to microentrepreneurs than NGOs (Almeyda, 1996). 
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has been concerned with the question of 
how to expand services to microenterprises on a sustainable basis, and in November of 1996 it 
sponsored a conference with 1 7 regulated financial intermediaries from 16 countries. Among the 
participants were state-owned banks, private commercial banks, regulated finance companies and 
NGOs that had transformed themselves into banks. The event was a first attempt to convene bankers 
involved in microfinance to share their experiences, learn best practices from one another, and 
discuss obstacles to further expansion. This study draws principally from interviews held with these 
bankers. In a preliminary fashion, it documents some of this fledgling and diverse experience. 
II. The Challenge of Microfinance for Commercial Banks 
A. Why Bankers Have Not Offered Microfinance Services 
Private, domestic commercial banking is a relatively recent phenomenon in many developing 
countries, especially in Africa. While limited domestic banking existed in some Asian and Latin 
American countries in the past century, the subsidiaries or agents of foreign banks dominated in 
foreign trade activity. In the 1950s through the 1970s, financial systems in many developing 
countries were predominantly composed of state-owned banks and of branches of foreign-owned 
commercial banks which provided short-term commercial and trade credit. The state-owned banks 
promoted economic development priorities through a network of financial institutions such as 
agricultural banks, development banks, and export banks, while borrowing heavily from multilateral 
and foreign private banks to support these efforts (World Development Report, 1989; Gonzalez-
Vega and Graham, 1995). The private local banks that did exist were typically relatively small, and 
often served a closed set of business groups. 
The regulatory repression of formal financial markets in most developing countries up to the 1980s, 
i.e. interest rate ceilings, high reserve requirements, and directed credit lines, largely precluded the 
potential for established banks to service a higher cost and riskier microenterprise clientele. Banks 
were prohibited from charging sufficiently high interest rates to cover the costs and risks of lending 
to this clientele. With the advent of structural adjustment processes and financial liberalization in 
the 1980s, private domestic commercial banking expanded rapidly. Many new private banks were 
founded by large business groups for the purpose of accessing funds for their own businesses and 
corporations. As such, they naturally favored the large accounts of an established clientele. When 
granting loans to less familiar clients, banks protected themselves with asset (mostly real estate) 
collateral two to three times the value of the loans. Although the new regulatory environment was 
more favorable, these new commercial bankers were unlikely providers of loans to small businesses, 
small farmers, and microentrepreneurs. 
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Competition is growing, however, as new banks enter the market under banking laws that allow 
more freedom of entry and a less repressed regulatory environment. For example, Honduras has 18 
commercial banks for an economically active population of 1. 7 million people; most of these institu-
tions were licensed in the last decade and are still small. The struggle to survive is forcing many of 
these banks to look at new markets, including the microfinance market, and the deregulation of 
financial markets is creating an environment in which these opportunities can now be explored for 
the first time within the regulated financial sector. 
Most bankers have not regarded microfinance as a genuine option, however, because they have 
believed it unprofitable. When asked why they do not pursue microfinance, traditional commercial 
bankers have typically expressed three basic concerns: 
1) Too Risky: Bankers perceive small businesses and microenterprises as bad credit risks. 
2) 
Many insolvent state-owned agricultural banks seemed to prove that small farmer clients 
could not or would not repay their loans. The perception is that small clients do not have 
stable, viable businesses for which to borrow and from which to generate repayment. 
Moreover, these potential clients lack traditional collateral to guarantee their loans. Finally, 
banks no doubt also recognized they did not have appropriate lending technologies to serve 
these clienteles (i.e., correct screening mechanisms to separate good from bad credit risks). 
Too Expensive: Bankers also believe that because micro loans are small and short-term, 
bank operations will be inefficient and costly. It takes the same amount of time and effort 
(if not more) to make a $1,000 loan as a $100,000 loan, but the return on the larger loan is 
much greater. So why make a small loan? 
3) Socio-economic and Cultural Barriers: According to bankers, small and micro business 
clients have difficulty approaching the bank because they lack education and do not possess 
business records to demonstrate cash flow. In many developing countries, social, cultural 
and language barriers do not allow for an easy relationship with a modern banking 
institution. 
It is hoped, however, that with a more widespread diffusion of innovations in financial technologies, 
reducing the risks and costs of microlending, more banks will begin to incorporate microentre-
preneurs into their portfolios. 
B. Comparative Advantages of Commercial Banks in Microfinance 
At first glance, banks would appear well positioned to offer financial services to ever increasing 
numbers of micro finance clients and to earn a profit. Banks have several advantages over non-bank, 
microlending NGOs: 
* they are regulated institutions fulfilling the conditions of ownership, financial 
disclosure, and capital adequacy that help to ensure prudent management; 
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many have physical infrastructure, including a large network of branches, from which 
to expand and reach out to a substantial number of microfinance clients; 
they have well-established internal controls and administrative and accounting 
systems to keep track of a large number of transactions; 
their ownership structures of private capital tend to encourage sound governance 
structures, cost-effectiveness, and profitability, which leads to sustainability; 
they have their own sources of funds (deposits and equity capital); hence they do not 
have to depend on scarce and volatile donor resources·(as do NGOs); and 
they offer loans, deposits, and other financial products that are, in principle, attractive 
to a microfinance clientele. 
All of these advantages could give banks a special edge over microlending NGOs in providing 
microfinancial services. 
C. Obstacles for Commercial Banks in Microfinance 
Banks lack, however, some key ingredients - most of all, the financial technologies to reach a low-
income population. They also face thorny internal constraints which must be overcome before they 
can produce a large, successful microfinance program. 
Our study of banks in micro finance identified at least six key interrelated issues that banks need to 
resolve in order to enter the microfinance market successfully: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Commitment: the commitment of commercial banks (particularly the larger banks) 
to microenterprise lending is often fragile, and generally dependent upon one or two 
visionary board members rather than based solidly in its institutional mission. 
Organizational design: Microfinance programs need to be inserted into the larger 
bank structure in such a way that they have relative independence and, at the same 
time, can handle thousands of small transactions efficiently. 
Financial technology: Banks need to acquire an appropriate financial technology to 
service the microenterprise sector, i.e. financial innovations that permit a cost-
effective analysis of creditworthiness, the monitoring of a large number of relatively 
poor clients and the adoption of effective collateral substitutes. 
Human resources: Given that microfinance programs differ so radically from tradi-
tional banking, banks must recruit and retain a specialized staff to manage these 
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D. 
programs. Issues of recruitment, training, and performance-related incentives require 
special consideration. 
Cost-effectiveness: Micro finance programs are costly because of the small size of 
loans. The typically higher overhead levels of banks (well-remunerated staff, elegant 
buildings, information management systems) cannot be sustained by a microfinance 
program alone. Strategies must be found to reduce costs by rapidly expanding the 
scale of its microenterprises portfolio (i.e., increasing the number of loans). Banks 
must organize microfinance operations and specialized training by covering costs 
through scale economies. 
Regulation and supervision: Banks must communicate with banking authorities to 
ensure that reporting and regulatory requirements take into account the specialized 
nature of micro finance programs. 
Purpose of the Study 
The bulk of the data for this study comes from interviews with 17 bankers attending a Commercial 
Banks in Microfinance conference held in November 1996 in Washington, D.C. Information for an 
additional bank (BancoSol) was incorporated from a separate study carried out by Ohio State 
University researchers. The three-day conference focused on four principal topics: products and 
services, bank structure and branch management, staffing, training, and incentives, and regulation 
and supervision. As the largest gathering so far of microfinance bankers, the conference presented 
a unique opportunity to understand better the progress and obstacles facing this field. 
The purpose of this paper is three-fold: 
• to briefly document the experiences with microfinance programs of these 17 banks; 
• to describe some of the main issues they face; and 
• given the small scale of most of these operations, to draw some conclusions concerning their 
future as large-scale providers of micro financial services. 
It should be made clear at the outset that, given the small sample of banks reviewed for this study, 
the analysis and conclusions derived are preliminary and will require future verification, as the field 
grows. 
Chapter Two discusses some of the major obstacles that burden commercial banks as they enter the 
microfinance market, and it suggests that some institutional types may manage these problems better 
than others. Chapter Three describes the lending experiences of the 17 participating banks at the 
Commercial Banks in Micro finance conference and of BancoSol, which was invited but unable to 
participate. The diversity of the experiences will become apparent, as well as the fact that banks are 
making substantial progress in entering the market. Chapter Four draws some preliminary conclu-
sions based on the findings and discussion in Chapters Two and Three, and it offers recommenda-
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tions as to how to promote the scaling-up of commercial bank microenterprise activity and potential 
roles for the donor community in this endeavor. 
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CHAPTER TWO: ISSUES FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS IN 
MICRO FINANCE 
I. Types of Banks in Microfinance 
The banks reviewed in this study differ from one another in many respects. Each operates in a 
different cultural and economic context, and each has a somewhat different institutional structure 
and mandate. In general, there were four main types of intermediaries: 
1) Full-service private commercial banks. Most have a national presence and offer a host of 
financial products and services through an extensive branch network. 
2) State-owned banks. These large banks provide multiple services according to government 
priorities. They often act as a channel for government transfers, payments, or receivables, 
and usually serve a large number of depositors. 
3) Finance companies and specialized banks. These smaller financial institutions focus on a 
particular sector, such as housing or consumer lending and generally have a regional rather 
than a national presence. 
4) Microlending NGOs transformed into regulated banks or specialized financial institutions. 
These small institutions have limited regional presence and a highly specialized program. 
Because of their different origins, each of these types of institutions approaches microfinance slightly 
differently, and each faces somewhat different obstacles. For our analysis, we found it useful to 
merge the first two bank types into one group and the second two specialty institutions into another 
group. Both the size and degree of specialization of the bank heavily influence its approach to the 
microfinance market and its ability to resolve the key constraints discussed below. The 17 banks of 
the conference plus BancoSol can be divided into two broad categories as illustrated in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 Roster of Banks Interviewed with Characteristic Ownership Structure and 
M' I d' I d' 1996 1cro en ID~ n 1cators ID 
A. Large, Multi-Service Banks Ownership Microlending Indicators 
Banco Agricola Comercial El Salvador Private bank with many 3.3% of portfolio in ML 
shareholders 
Banco del Desarrollo Chile Private bank with many I 00% of portfolio in ML for 
shareholders microenterorise subsidiary 
Banco del Pacifico Ecuador Private bank with many 2% of portfolio in ML 
shareholders 
Bank of Nova Scotia Guyana Private international bank. MF 9% of portfolio in ML 
Subsidiarv. I 00% for subsidiary 
Banco Wiese Peru Private bank with few I 0% of portfolio in ML 
shareholders 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia Indonesia State-owned bank. Unit Desa 100% of portfolio in ML for Unit 
program. Desa program 
Multi-credit Bank Panama Private bank with few I 0% of portfolio in ML 
shareholders 
National Development Bank Egypt Private bank with many 3.7% of portfolio in ML 
shareholders 
Standard Bank South Africa Private bank with many Negligible ML portfolio. 
shareholders Large savings program. 
Worker's Bank Jamaica Private bank with many New credit program. Large micro 
shareholders savings. 
B. Small and Specialized Banks 
BancoSol Bolivia NGO transformation 100% of portfolio in ML 
Bank Dagang Bali Indonesia Family-owned bank 83% of portfolio in ML 
Banco Empresarial Guatemala Private bank with few 11 % of portfolio in ML 
shareholders 
Caja Los Andes Bolivia NGO transformation 100% of portfolio in ML 
Centenary Bank Uganda Private bank with few 83% of portfolio in ML 
shareholders 
Family Finance Building Kenya Housing finance company with 85% of portfolio in ML 
Society few shareholders 
Financiera Familiar Paraguay Consumer lending company 20% of portfolio in ML 
with few shareholders 
Panabo Rural Bank Philippines Rural bank with few 27% of portfolio in ML 
shareholders 
Source: Interviews with bankers at November 1996 conference. 
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The ten large multi-service banks record asset and deposit levels many multiples greater than those 
of the small, specialized banks. Indeed in most cases they rank among the largest banks in their 
respective countries. Not surprisingly, their capital or equity base consists of many shareholders and, 
with the exception of the state-owned Bank Rakyat Indonesia, microlending constitutes a relatively 
small share of the banks total portfolio (typically below 10 percent). 
In this institutional setting, microfinance will not rank high among the operational divisions within 
the bank, and the future of these programs will strongly depend upon the support of a few important 
shareholders or bank officers. Furthermore, even programs that break even and generate earnings 
are not necessarily secure. They still have to compete with other divisions with even higher earnings 
for use of the bank's scarce deposit funds. In contrast to free-standing microlending NGOs, 
microenterprise programs in commercial banks must meet a demanding opportunity cost criterion 
to continue growing with bank resources. At the same time, some banks, to protect their image, may 
find it difficult to charge a sufficiently high interest rate on microloans to cover their costs. 
The eight small specialized banks, in contrast, have incorporated microenterprise lending as an 
important mission for the institution. These banks consist of former financial NGOs that are 
becoming banks or bank-equivalent institutions, consumer lending or housing finance companies, 
or private banks with a few shareholders all of whom are generally committed to microlending. 
Micro and small loan activity constitutes a far more important share of their total portfolios as these 
institutions penetrate the niche markets of microenterprise lending. 
II. The Policy Environment and Six Key Obstacles Banks Face in 
Micro finance 
This preliminary review of banks in microfinance first documents how the financial market policy 
environment has improved substantially in practically all the countries where the banks in this study 
operate. This positive development was necessary but not a sufficient condition for microfinance 
institutions to emerge in the formal banking world. Banks still face six interrelated obstacles as they 
seek to operate successful micro finance programs. The discussion of these issues is still preliminary. 
The information on each bank was gathered from a brief interview of one bank officer attending the 
conference and from responses by banks to a written questionnaire. Detailed field case studies were 
not performed for the 17 banks attending the conference. 
A. The Policy Environment 
The policy arena is of strategic importance for commercial banks. Non-bank microlending NGOs 
can operate in a repressed financial market environment since they are not subject to the regulatory 
interest rate ceilings, high reserve requirements, and selective (i.e. targeted) credit policies 
characteristic of these markets. Commercial banks, however, cannot escape these regulations that, 
in the end, reduce their profit margins. Rarely have commercial banks considered microfinance 
initiatives while operating under a regime of financial repression. In contrast, markets experiencing 
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substantial financial liberalization offer a far more promising opportunity for experiments in 
microfinance. Banks are able to charge the relatively high interest rates on microloans required to 
cover lending and default costs and the opportunity cost of funds. 
Table 2.2 indicates that, by the early to mid- l 990s, the banks in this study were largely operating in 
favorable financial markets. The countries in which these banks functioned had all undertaken 
stabilization efforts from the late 1980s onwards (and some, such as Indonesia and Chile, from much 
earlier). Low average rates of inflation (column 1) are evident in most countries, with Latin 
America, on average, registering slightly higher rates than the other regions. Only Ecuador registers 
an annual rate of inflation in the 20 percent range. Panama is a striking exception. Its currency has 
been historically tied one to one with the U.S. dollar. Consequently, this country has not experienced 
the inflationary history of its neighbors nor financial repression; hence, it never needed stabilization 
policies nor deregulation. 
All countries except one have deregulated deposit and loan interest rates (column 4). This has 
contributed to the emergence of the positive real loan rates shown in column 3, reflecting the 
strength of the liberalization efforts in these settings by the mid- l 990s. Only South Africa has 
maintained an interest rate ceiling for commercial banks through a restrictive usury law from which 
it has occasionally allowed limited exemptions. The Standard Bank launched its microenterprise 
initiative in 1994 with one of these exemptions. In 1996, however, all exemptions had been revoked 
for regulated banks. 
Reserve requirements (column 5) are the other potential impediment for commercial banks 
considering a commercial platform in microfinance. The higher the reserve requirement, the less the 
deposit base available for on-lending, the lower are profits, and the less likely banks would consider 
a novel and initially costly effort in microfinance. For countries with a poorly developed market for 
government securities, reserve requirements are the classic policy instrument to control inflation. 
Therefore, in the early stages of stabilization in low income countries, reserve requirements can 
reach 50 percent or higher, as the authorities exercise heavy controls on monetary expansion in the 
banking system. Even in countries with relatively well-developed government securities markets 
(e.g., Latin America), high reserve requirements are a convenient mechanism for governments to 
secure resources to finance their fiscal deficits. Most of the Latin American countries in Table 2.2 
experienced these high reserve requirements in the mid-to-late 1980s. This is one of the reasons why 
commercial bank microfinance efforts did not emerge in this region until the early 1990s, when these 
requirements declined to more modest levels. Panama and Chile are exceptions to this pattern, as 
stabilization was not needed in the former and stabilization occurred much earlier in the later. 
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Table 2.2: Selected National Financial Market Indicators for Relevant Countries, 
1995-96 (Countries Ranked by Within-Region Inflation). 
(Countries Rate of Nominal Real Loan Dereg- Reserve Financial Financial 
Ranked by Inflation Loan Rate Rate 1995- ulated Req. Deepening Deepening 
Inflation 1995- 1995-96b 96° interest 1996d ratio" ratio" 
within Region) 96" rates 1989 1994 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Africa 
Uganda 6.9 19.8 13. l yes 18.9 3.7 9.8 
South Africa 7.6 19.3 10.9 no 3.1 55.5 50.4 
Egypt 8.1 15.5 6.8 yes 20.6 78.5 97.2 
Kenya 11.1 33.4 20.l yes 20.1 25.3 41.0 
Asia 
Philippines 7.0 15.0 7.5 yes 11.9 31.0 41.2 
Indonesia 7.3 19.2 11.1 yes 16.6 32.0 37.3 
Latin 
Ameri£!! 
Panamar 1.0 10.5 9.4 yes 28.6 64.8 
Chile 6.7 17.4 10.0 yes 8.0 35.5 34.9 
Paraguay 9.4 29.4 18.3 yes 33. l 13.4 24.7 
Guyana 9.7 18. l 8.1 yes 19.6 54.6 45.1 
El Salvador 9.8 19.2 8.6 yes 34.9 20.5 36.4 
Guatemala 11.3 23.6 10. l yes 31.9 19.4 23.4 
Peru 11.8 36.4 23.0 yes 34.9 15.2 34.9 
Bolivia 13.4 yes 13.3 12.5 45.1 
Bolivianos 30.7 15.2 13.3 
Dollars($) 18.8 4.8 10.0 
Jamaica 14.4 45.l 26.8 yes 32.9 44.0 40.0 
Ecuador 23.4 57.4 27.5 yes 11.3 11.0 30.7 
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, various monthly issues, 1996. Data for 
Bolivia and Guyana secured from World Bank offices responsible for those countries. Information on 
deregulated interest rates secured from desk officers at World Bank and Newsletter of Policy Research 
Development Policy, Inter American Development Bank, Dec. 1996. 
a: Average from roughly mid-1995 to mid-1996. 
b: Average Prime rate in loan markets from IFS data from mid 1995 to mid 1996. 
c: Estimated from i-p where i =nominal loan rate (col. 2) and p =rate of inflation (col. 1) 
1 +p 
d: Estimated from data in International Financial Statistics for first quarter of 1996 (reserves, line 20 as a 
share of demand, time and savings deposits - lines 24, 25). 
e. M2 (demand deposits plus savings and term deposits) to GDP. 
f. Panama has no central bank, hence no reserve requirements are recorded in column 5. 
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The Asian and African countries listed in Table 2.2 experienced less severe stabilization drives since 
their initial inflation rates were lower. By the mid-l 990s, their reserve requirements were generally 
much lower than those in most of the Latin American countries (Chile and Panama again excepted). 
Authorities in Paraguay, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru and Jamaica still administer fairly high 
reserve requirements growing out of the fiscal deficits that remain in these countries. 
Some banks, Banco Empresarial in Guatemala among others, complained that high reserve require-
ments in their countries were constraining the profit potential of their banks. It is also of interest to 
note that Bolivia, with an impressive tradition of recent microlending NGOs maturing into bank and 
near bank institutions, has unusually low reserve requirements and high levels of financial deepening 
(column 7) by Latin American standards in the mid-l 990s. 
Finally, it is evident that the financial liberalization measures carried out in these countries have 
succeeded in increasing the level of financial deepening from 1989 to 1994, the period during which 
most of these bank-sponsored microenterprise programs were launched or microlending NGOs were 
transformed into banks (columns 6 and 7) . All countries with low levels of financial deepening in 
1989 increased the of Mz to GDP ratio substantially by 1994. 1 This global measure of financial 
market development underscores the increasingly favorable policy environment for these program 
initiatives in the early 1990s for most of the countries in this study. 
B. Remaining Obstacles for Banks in Microfinance 
While important, a favorable policy environment is not sufficient for a successful commercial bank 
involvement in microfinance. At the level of the financial intermediary, several other conditions 
contribute to this success. These conditions are discussed below. 
1. Commitment and Bank Culture 
Commitment at the highest levels of the bank is necessary to make a micro finance program work 
successfully. Without this support, microfinance programs will not receive the human and financial 
resources they require to consolidate and expand. Especially for the large, multi-service banks, the 
issue of commitment is a true constraint. Microfinance programs are so different from conventional 
corporate banking that they are generally not understood by most mid-level bank managers, and 
sometimes they are even considered a second-class activity. For corporate bankers, career 
advancement is generally a function of success with large loan placements, which is rewarded with 
increased delegation of authority to make even larger loan decisions. In this context, an officer's 
portfolio of hundreds of tiny loans adding up to a small dollar volume is not a sign of success or a 
promising path for career advancement in the institution. 
1 The unusually low ratio for financial deepening in Panama in 1989 reflects the capital flight 
associated with the period leading up to the fall of Noriega, the high ratio in 1994 reflects the 
renewed post-Noriega role as an offshore banking site for funds from overseas. 
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These organizational threats to the program appear to be most critical in cases where the 
micro finance unit competes for resources and status with other bank divisions (corporate, inter-
national). Many bankers at the conference reported that it was difficult to work in an unsupportive 
corporate culture. The lack of strong commitment and of an accepting bank culture appears to 
explain in part the short life of the microenterprise program at the Standard Bank of South Africa. 
Even one of the first entrants in microfinance, the Banco del Pacifico in Ecuador, has maintained 
only a small microfinance program in a large corporate structure. After 23 years of operations in 
microfinance, it only has 4,000 active loan clients. 
Part of the problem appears to lie in the fact that the programs initiated in larger full-service or 
corporate banks are usually established to fulfill a particular vision of an individual founder, owner 
or board member. Unfortunately, this vision is not always translated into a clearly defined and 
articulated institutional mission and its associated structure, and it often lacks widespread support 
from mid-level managers. As a result, the microfinance unit becomes the special project of a 
protective bank leader. At the conference, three of the bankers expressed concern over the future 
survival of the bank's microfinance efforts once their protector left. 
Nevertheless, most of the large banks are funding their microenterprise programs out of their own 
deposit resources with relatively minor reliance on donor or government funds. Most of the large 
banks are risking millions of dollars of their own deposit or equity base to fund these programs. 
Banco Wiese, for example, funds the entire US $19 million microenterprise portfolio from internal 
sources. While this is a sure reflection of current commitment, given that most microenterprise 
programs are relatively young it is hard to tell whether this commitment will be long-lasting. As will 
be noted below, administrative designs that separate microfinance more explicitly from the rest of 
the bank may offer the large banks a solution to the problem of an unsupportive bank culture. The 
high opportunity cost of using the bank's own resources, however, still remains an issue. 
As already pointed out, small and specialized banks appear to have a stronger institutional 
commitment to microfinance. These banks generally have few shareholders, which facilitates the 
formulation of narrower institutional missions. All of the small and specialized banks have small 
ownership structures and most have larger percentages (in some cases all) of their portfolio in 
microfinance. Thus, their institutional culture is geared towards servicing a lower-income clientele 
with specialized products. 
2. Administrative Structure 
For the large, multi-service banks, the administrative structure of the microfinance unit is particularly 
difficult to design. Among the large banks interviewed, we found four administrative approaches: 
Independent Structures 
1) Fully-independent microenterprise retail centers, affiliated to the bank but with their own 
lending policies, staff, and information systems, which report to the larger bank: Banco del 
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2) 
Desarrollo's microfinance subsidiary in Chile, the Unit Desa system of the BRI in Indonesia, 
the Scotia Enterprises Program of the Nova Scotia Bank in Guyana. 
Lending through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which in turn on-lend to 
microenterprise clients: Banco Wiese in Peru. 
Integrated Structures 
3) Semi-independent microenterprise units lending directly and/or with specialized windows 
in each bank branch, staffed with a microfinance credit officer. Administrative and financial 
functions are integrated into the larger bank: Banco Agricola Comercial, Banco del Pacifico, 
Financiera Familiar. 
4) Fully-integrated operations, wherein the small-business credit officers also handle micro-
enterprise clients. All administrative, personnel, and financial systems are integrated: 
Centenary, Multi-credit Bank, Caja de Ahorro y Credito Los Andes. 
In general, it appears that the more specialized and independent the microfinance unit, the easier it 
is to institute appropriate microfinance lending technologies and policies and to avoid interference 
from the larger bank culture. This was clearly evident with banks that had organized fully-
independent centers or subsidiaries which in turn managed their own retail outlets and were 
structurally shielded from the rest of the bank (Banco del Desarrollo, BRI, and Nova Scotia Bank). 
Perhaps the most dramatic example is Scotia Enterprises, which operates a group-lending program 
with loans mostly under US $300 (one of the very few banks doing so), under the umbrella of a 
large, sophisticated, foreign-owned commercial bank. While this autonomy represents an additional 
cost to these banks, it appears to generate a positive tradeoff in that it secures an appropriately-
structured operating environment for the microfinance activity. 
Wholesale lending directly through NGOs was reported in at least one bank, Banco Wiese of Peru. 
This approach could be an option for some other large national banks interested in reaching out to 
a microenterprise clientele in so far as there is a promising set of microlending NGOs in the country. 
The challenge here lies in the correct selection of solvent NGO microfinance programs and the 
structuring of clear, efficient, and mutually beneficial relationships between the NGOs and the bank. 
Here the bank is the principal and the NGOs are the agents. Monitoring (i.e., agency costs) are still 
involved, but the bank may find this contractual design easier. In short, it may be able to design 
compatible incentives for the NGOs to fulfill their contractual obligations than trying to lend directly 
to microentrepreneurs. If successful, this on-lending alternative creates a win-win situation, freeing 
the bank of the administrative burden of direct micro lending while, at the same time, enhancing its 
public image. The NGO, in turn, secures a source of funding for its microenterprise clientele without 
engaging in the costly and difficult task of mobilizing its own deposit base (if ever) before it is fully 
prepared to do so and be freer to charge high, cost covering interest rates than banks may be able to 
do. 
14 
A solution loaded with difficulties has been that of fully integrating microfinancial services into 
larger commercial banks, using traditional individual loan technologies and expecting credit officers 
to handle microfinance as well as small and medium business lending. The disincentive for credit 
officers to attend to the microfinance clients was evident in the Banco Agricola Comercial in El 
Salvador, for example, which reported substantially fewer microloans from its branches where credit 
officers handled all lending than from its microenterprise unit. Unfortunately, although the 
microenterprise unit was authorized to engage in direct microlending, it lacked independence and 
answered to the bank's consumer lending department. Financiera Familiar in Paraguay, however, 
appeared to have had more success in incorporating its microlending into its consumer lending units. 
Banco del Desarrollo in Chile and the National Development Bank of Egypt utilized their branch 
networks and created specialized microlending units in their branches. 
Administrative design issues were less problematic for the smaller and more specialized institutions 
in Table 2.1, since these institutions had more substantial microfinance programs. Banco 
Empresarial may be an exception. As an institution dedicated to small and medium sized businesses 
by institutional mandate, this bank was attempting to modify its conventional individual loan 
methodology to reach microenterprise clients. At the same time, the bank has tried to reach more 
microenterprise clients by setting up loan windows in department stores and supermarkets and by 
changing banking hours to coincide with shop and store hours. This greatly reduces transaction costs 
for borrowers and creates the potential for greater scale economies in the future. 
3. Financial Technologies 
Jlllicrolending 
Over the years, non-governmental organizations in microfinance have developed innovative lending 
technologies to reach poor clients with micro- loans. They have borrowed many of their practices 
from infonnal finance. Absence of these technologies explains, in part, why formal lending 
institutions such as banks have traditionally had difficulty reaching microclients. Some of the 
principal characteristics of the microlending technologies are: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
short-term, working capital loans 
lending based on character, rather than collateral 
sequential loans, starting small and increasing in size 
group loan mechanisms as a collateral substitute 
quick cash flow analysis of businesses and households, especially for individual loan 
technologies 
prompt loan disbursement and simple loan procedures 
frequent repayment schedules to facilitate monitoring of borrowers 
interest rates considerably higher than those for larger bank customers to cover all 
costs of the microfinance program 
prompt loan collection procedures 
simple lending facilities, close to the clientele 
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* 
* 
staff drawn from the local communities with access to information about potential 
clients 
computerization with special software to allow loan tracking for larger programs. 
While the large, multi-service banks have important comparative advantages to reach out to large 
numbers of clients through branch networks, microlending methods are foreign to them and must 
be assimilated. It is not enough to simply reach further down with the conventional banking 
technology. Large banks which have successfully made the jump to specialized microfinance tend 
also to be those that have radically separated the program from the rest of the bank. The BRI, the 
Banco del Desarrollo, the Bank of Nova Scotia, and the Banco Wiese are examples of this trend. 
Those institutions with programs integrated into the conventional bank structure tend to have greater 
difficulty in implementing the specialized microfinance technology. Interest rates present a thorny 
issue for some integrated programs. Many banks charged the same rate of interest for 
microenterprise loans as to their regular clients, although they knew the former levied higher costs. 
When asked why, they usually explained that the bank would receive bad publicity if it charged 
higher rates to poorer clients. 
Many of the banks had not adopted other microfinance best practice technologies. They had 
minimum terms to maturity that were too long, such as 12 months; maximum loan terms were also 
too long, some up to six years. Bank offices were somewhat removed from the microenterprise 
clientele. Collection procedures emphasized past-due letters as opposed to prompt visits from the 
credit officer. Collection responsibilities were assigned to the bank's loan collection department 
rather than to the microfinance program itself. Loan procedures did not differentiate between first-
time and repeat loans. 
Most banks provided loans without requiring real estate collateral (although the BRl uses the 
borrower's house plot and Centenary Bank would try to secure liens on business premises). Banks 
with larger microloans tended to require clients to pledge personal property and household goods or 
find cosigners. Banks with smaller loans relied more heavily on references and character-based 
information. 
By and large, the small and specialized banks had adopted more elements of the financial technology 
described above, and some had even instituted interesting innovations. Financiera Familiar, for 
example, had implemented a smart card for its clients, such that processing for third and subsequent 
loans took only 20 minutes. Centenary Bank and Caja Los Andes followed a similar pattern whereby 
an immediate credit line is made available without further credit analysis for perfect repayers after 
two loans. This greatly reduces both lending and borrowing costs. The smart card technology for 
these three institutions was introduced through technical assistance from !PC/Frankfurt. 
While all of the banks have instituted some microfinance techniques and innovations, only a few 
have carefully thought through all of the elements of their financial product. After the conference, 
many bankers confessed a need to adjust their loan prices and their operating procedures. 
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Microdeposits 
The new microfinance bankers knew relatively little about deposit mobilization technologies that 
reach the low-income and/or microenterprise client. There were some notable exceptions, however, 
such as the BRI and the Bank Dagang Bali. Perhaps best known is the BRI Unit Desa savings 
program, which has the following characteristics: 
Features attractive to the microclient: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
liquid passbook savings accounts and low minimum balances 
depositories conveniently located 
secure deposits 
real, positive interest rates on deposits 
Operational features of the program: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
savings accounts with very low minimum balances 
lower levels of interest, compared to commercial banks, because of higher administrative 
costs 
simple, hospitable buildings and mobile units with low overhead 
simple administrative forms and procedures 
courteous and friendly staff 
incentives for savings, such as lotteries 
Although all the banks interviewed were authorized to capture deposits, only four (Bank Dagang 
Bali, BRI, Standard Bank, Worker's Bank) had instituted large-scale programs or campaigns 
explicitly to attract very small depositors. Most of the microfinance bankers at the conference were 
heads of lending units, and had no relationship whatsoever to deposit-taking. This focus on lending 
is not surprising, since donor funds, which have contributed to the entry of many of these banks into 
microfinance, have concentrated on credit programs. 
Most banks reported having savings accounts with small balances under $500. Some had substantial 
numbers, such as the Banco Agricola Comercial with 38,169 savings accounts under $500, or the 
Centenary Bank in Uganda with 42,000. Unlike the programs of the BRI, Worker's Bank, Bank 
Dagang Bali and Standard Bank, which were focused on reaching a specific target market, these did 
not appear to require a concerted effort to reach a large low-income population. Centenary, for exam-
ple, allowed for a minimum savings balance of only $10 dollars whereas other banks in Uganda re-
quire $50 dollars. This general deposit policy was sufficient to attract large numbers of small savers. 
4. Human Resources 
Up to recently microfinance technologies have been labor-intensive, and all the bankers interviewed 
evinced special concern for recruitment, training, and motivation of staff. 
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Recruitment 
Most banks hired micro finance staff from outside the bank and preferred young university graduates 
with little if any banking experience. The lack of a banking background apparently made them more 
receptive to the special mission and practices of the micro finance program. This is consistent with 
findings in other microfinance institutions (Rhyne and Rotblatt, 1994). There was some disagree-
ment over the minimum qualifications for a credit officer. Some banks considered that credit staff 
should have university degrees, coupled with a social service mind-set. The Banco del Pacifico, for 
example, required a degree, since its credit promoters also provide clients with business development 
advice. Unfortunately, such qualifications drive up operating expenses, since salaries are the single 
largest expense item in microfinance programs. In the case of the BRI and the Banco Wiese, NGO 
promoters were generally high school graduates from the same social class as the clientele. 
The most common feature among loan officers was that they were typically recruited from the local 
areas where the bank's microfinance unit operated and micro loans were made. This feature 
allegedly allowed loan officers to conduct their loan screening and monitoring efforts efficiently 
since they were familiar with the local clientele and their activities. One exception to this practice 
was noted in Uganda, where Centenary Bank does not assign its loan officers to their home areas to 
avoid the perceived negative impact of strong kinship pressures on effective loan administration. 
Another important impact of cultural values influencing loan administration concerns 'Vomen loan 
officers in Centenary Bank. It is not acceptable for women to ride motorbikes in Uganda, especially 
outside the capital city of Kampala. Hence, women loan officers (who comprise roughly 25 percent 
of total loan officers) cannot be used with clienteles that live beyond the means of public transporta-
tion. This restricts the area that can be served by these officers. Also, it is not easy for women 
officers to handle male clients, particularly those who become delinquent borrowers, without a male 
team member to assist in these sometimes disputatious meetings. It makes more sense to use women 
officers to focus more on building up the base of women clienteles where these impediments are 
absent. 
Staff Training 
Fourteen of the seventeen banks (both large and small) reported in-house, on-the.job training for new 
staff. This specialized training is costly, but probably a necessity. All banks require their staff to 
be familiar with microfinance technologies and operating systems and procedures, and they hold 
meetings clearly articulating the institutional mission in micro finance. Of the sample banks studied, 
the BRI had the most highly-developed training program. To maintain a staff of over 14,000, the 
Unit Desa program has five regional training centers at which approximately 6,000 employees are 
trained each year. BancoSol and Caja Los Andes have also expanded rapidly, ranking among the 
most successful originators and adapters of new microfinance technologies in the banking world. 
The former stands out as one of the preeminent programs in group loan technology, the latter one 
of the leaders in individual loan technology. Both institutions had strong staff training programs as 
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a catalyst to incorporate these technologies successfully, drawing heavily upon specialized foreign 
assistance NGOs/finns, Accion International for BancoSol and !PC/Frankfurt for Caja Los Andes. 
Staff Remuneration and Incentives 
Studies of successful microfinance NGOs reveal that credit officer salaries tend to be lower than 
those found in conventional commercial banking. This is due to the fact that these programs, by 
nature, are highly labor intensive and hence costly. For the large bank integrated microfinance 
programs, however, salary levels can present some difficulties. In one case, salary scales were 
different and a perfonnance-based bonus remuneration scheme existed for the microfinance staff. 
This created some tension with non-microfinance bank staff who earned conventional fixed salaries. 
Most others use the same salary structure of the rest of the bank. In at least three cases, no bonus 
system existed, perhaps because the salaries were considered adequate already. Banks that have 
independent microfinance units are able to have their own lower salary scale and introduce bonus 
schemes without drawing much attention from the rest of the bank staff. 
More generally, the best practice institutions have strong incentive systems in place to motivate 
productivity. Programs must be productive in order to lower costs. Among the bank sample, only 
five out of seventeen banks did not have some kind of bonus system. Four of those five banks were 
large national banks with extensive branch networks. Those that had incentive systems generally 
had either: 
a) bonuses for the individual or a team, based on productivity and profitability, or 
b) distributions to all staff based on profitability of the overall bank. 
The small and specialized banks and the fully-independent subsidiaries of banks tend to offer 
bonuses oriented specifically to enhance the individual or team's productivity. Financiera Familiar 
in Paraguay, Centenary in Uganda, and Caja de Ahorro y Credito Los Andes in Bolivia reported staff 
incentive systems based on a fonnula of three key variables: quality of portfolio (measured by levels 
of delinquency), volume of lending and number of active loans. The Financiera Familiar reviewed 
staff perfonnance monthly, and paid bonuses to each individual officer. Caja de Los Andes reported 
that incentives sparked staff productivity. Los Andes credit officers carry impressive case loads of 
up to 700 individual loan clients. 
Bonus remuneration schemes are justified for individual microloan technologies since loan officers 
are engaged in demanding and time-consuming client evaluation practices. Given the highly 
discretionary element of individual judgement and commitment to hard work to carry out this task 
satisfactorily, it is felt that a good part of the loan officers' remuneration should reflect how well he 
or she carries out this task. Good judgement in client selection and evaluation and diligent work to 
ensure effective monitoring and loan recovery are essential for a well-perfonning individual loan 
portfolio. 
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The BRI also has a well-developed system, wherein 10 percent of the profits of each Unit Desa are 
distributed to the Unit Desa staff, usually a team of 4 or 5 people. Some of the larger, multi-service 
banks had general distributions depending on whether the bank had a good year. 
In summary, the most important question is not the level of salaries. It is the optimal distribution 
between the fixed salary and bonus portion of the remuneration. The purpose here is to solve 
important principal-agent problems, i.e., create incentives for loan officers to carry out their highly 
discretionary credit evaluations of clients responsibly. The measurement and monitoring of staff 
productivity is not trivial in micro finance and many of the most important efforts of client evaluation 
cannot be easily observed by supervisors. Hence, performance-based bonus incentives become an 
important part of loan officer remuneration, particularly for programs emphasizing individual loan 
technologies. 
5. Cost-Effectiveness 
Yet another issue of concern at the microfinance conference was cost reduction. While most bankers 
claimed that their programs were profitable (no specific figures were provided), they were 
nevertheless under the impression that costs were still too high. 
There appear to be a number of strategies to reduce costs. First, many banks could use a fuller 
implementation of the microfinance technologies mentioned above. For example, many banks had 
high salary structures that could be reduced by recruiting non-university degree staff. However, a 
caveat is in order here since the salary savings gained through hiring less educated staff could be 
more than offset by lower productivity. Other banks could experiment more fully with alternatives 
to lengthy individual business analysis techniques. Most could improve staff productivity levels 
through improved operating procedures and incentive systems. 
Second, banks could explore new technologies to expand lending. For example, the smart card 
option ofFinanciera Familiar appeared to be an excellent cost-cutter for processing repeat loans. It 
was also well received by clients, who enjoyed carrying their plastic status symbol. The credit line 
approach followed by Caja de Ahorro y Credito Los Andes and Centenary also comes to mind here 
as effective cost savings for good repeat customers. 
Third, independent profit or cost centers may be a cost-effective strategy for many of the large, 
multi-service banks. Although initially costly, the separation of programs helps to isolate the costs 
of the microfinance program and identify appropriate cost-saving measures. 
Finally, rather than reduce costs, many banks may need to increase their interest rates and simply 
accept the fact that microfinance programs are costlier. The eight banks that reported on 
non-financial costs as a percentage of the loan portfolio provided estimates ranging from 2 to 23 
percent with one outlier at 85 percent. The upper range of these figures in the 20 percent range are 
close to those measured for successful NGO microfinance institutions using best practices (Christen, 
Rhyne, Vogel, and McKean, 1995). 
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Although microfinance bankers complain of high costs, it is unclear that their programs are in fact 
costlier than those of financial NGOs or specialized institutions such as BancoSol and Caja de 
Ahorro y Credito Los Andes. Costs for microfinance are simply higher than those for conventional 
banking. What is also unclear, however, is whether the integrated programs are fully aware of the 
costs of the microfinance program. As noted earlier, in most of these cases administrative functions 
are handled by a centralized staff. Until there is a greater separation of costs in these programs, and 
until banks with microfinance programs feel freer to share income and expense data, the question 
of costs will remain largely an open question. 
6. Regulation and Supervision 
Most of the participants at the conference reported concerns about regulation and supervision. Three 
worries predominated: high legal reserve requirements, burdensome reporting requirements, and 
inappropriate criteria for loan portfolio classification and provisioning. 
Legal Reserve Requirements: In many developing countries, legal reserves on deposits are extremely 
high, in essence discouraging savings mobilization. Banks will be less likely to utilize their own, 
scarcer resources for microenterprise programs in this environment. As pointed out earlier in the 
discussion of the policy environment, reserve requirements have been lowered in most countries 
from those the banks experienced in the late 1980s. Still they are moderately high for five Latin 
American countries represented at the Conference and no doubt influence the degree of micro lending 
undertaken in these countries. 
Reporting Requirements: Sophisticated information systems are required to track and report on a 
voluminous microfinance portfolio. Only a few of the banks at the conference had large numbers 
(greater than 15,000) of loans outstanding at present (BRI, BancoSol, Caja Los Andes, NBD), so the 
experience on this front is still sketchy. Nevertheless, Banco Empresarial along with several others 
complained about the burdensome reporting requirements in their countries. 
Loan classification and provisioning: The regulatory issues of loan classification and provisioning 
for microfinance manifest themselves differently in different institutional frameworks. Private 
commercial banks with an established regulatory track record and a long history of operating from 
an established deposit base before launching a microenterprise program are subject to less risk 
compared to credit-only NGOs just launching a deposit mobilization effort. These banks typically 
make their own provisions for their undercollateralized micro clientele and have an interest in 
watching the bottom line closely given the opportunity cost of capital devoted to these programs. 
Authorities, however, may introduce reporting requirements that can generate transaction costs if 
they become too detailed. 
Capital adequacy: Microlending NGOs represent greater risk as they move from their original 
credit-only product lines into deposit taking for the first time. In contrast to already established 
private commercial banks, these new banks typically do not draw upon private equity stake-holders 
in any significant fashion. They generally build on donor-sponsored equity holdings and/or 
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employee shares. This unusual governance structure means that the equity owners would not be able 
to quickly supply new capital in a crisis generated by a shortfall in revenue. This points to the need 
to have these institutions meet higher capital adequacy standards than those associated with 
conventional banks (Rock and Otero, 1997, chapter II). 
On-site examinations: Unconventional governance structures imply that management may not be 
under a strict monitoring regime, thereby increasing management risk. This issue was widely 
discussed in the open sessions of the conference as the classic source ofrisk in these newly-emerging 
banks derived from microlending NGOs. This feature, combined with covariant risk (most clients 
subject to the same localized income shocks), underscores the volatility of their revenues. In short, 
volatile revenues and the inability to muster new capital quickly to service liquidity crises require 
that bank examiners devise new methods of site visits to determine the health of these portfolios. 
Merely inspecting the adequacy of collateral guarantees is inappropriate for these institutions. 
Discussion at the conference highlighted the usefulness of a random sampling framework to 
determine the share of performing and non-performing loans and documentation through site visits 
on the degree to which management personnel are following correct procedures and guidelines set 
forth in the institution's credit manual. Finally, the contract-enforcement environment for the 
microenterprise community could be improved ifthe regulatory authorities maintained a credit rating 
list of defaulted borrowers with individual loans. This information could be shared within the 
micro finance community to forestall the potential weakening of other institutions to whom these 
borrowers might tum for new loans (Rock and Otero, 1997). 
22 
CHAPTER THREE: COMMERCIAL BANKS AND MICROFINANCE: 
AN EMPIRICAL PROFILE 
I. Institutional Performance 
A. Outreach: Breadth and Depth 
This chapter presents an empirical profile of the microfinancial activity for each of the banks in this 
study, detailing comparatively the principal parameters of institutional performance, organizational 
structure, products and lending technology. Indicators presented in Table 3.1 provide a sketch of the 
outreach of a number of commercial banks engaged in the provision of microfinancial services 
across different regions of the world.2 The term commercial banks will be used throughout this 
chapter to refer both to the commercial banks and the few non-bank regulated financial 
intermediaries that will be discussed subsequently. 
First, the only state-owned bank in Table 3.1, the BRI oflndonesia, is clearly in a world of its own 
in the breadth of its microloan market. The numbers reached are above 2.4 million. The BRI has 
a much larger network of offices (unit desas), numbering in the thousands, drawing business from 
one of the most densely inhabited and dynamic rural areas in the world (Java), and it has a longer 
history of micro lending activity than most of the remaining banks in Table 3 .1. Hence, the number 
and volume of its microloans dwarfs the efforts of the private banks which, for the most part, have 
only launched their programs more recently, on a smaller scale, and in less densely populated 
markets. Nevertheless, most of the remaining discussion will emphasize these private commercial 
banks since they represent the new actors in the microfinance arena. 
Second, the total number of micro and small loans outstanding,3 the criteria used to rank these banks 
within Africa, Asia, and Latin America respectively, reflects a more modest outreach at best for the 
2 The banks discussed in this chapter were represented at the Conference on "Commercial Banks 
in Microfinance," held in Washington, D.C., November 18-20, 1996 under the auspices of the 
Agency for International Development, Microenterprise Office, Washington, D.C. The information 
used in this chapter is based on data reported by the respective bankers at the conference . 
• 
3 The term micro and small loans is used here to refer to the category of loans provided by 
commercial banks that are granted in loan amounts much smaller than the average bank loans and 
with terms and conditions that are usually different from those typical of commercial lending in these 
organizations. These loan sizes and terms and conditions will undoubtedly vary by country 
depending on the poverty level, income per capita, and the nature of the economy. Banks with no 
specialized microenterprise programs were asked to report information about their small-loan 
category, which included loans below US$5,000. 
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highest ranked private banks in each region.4 These banks are the National Bank for Development 
(NBD) in Egypt, the Bank Dagang Bali (BDB) in Indonesia, and BancoSol and Caja de Ahorro y 
Credito Los Andes in Bolivia. The National Bank for Development in Egypt is the only large 
organization among these three institutions. Interestingly, however, Banco del Desarrollo in Chile, 
which has the third largest number of micro and small loans outstanding in Latin America, and 
Banco Agricola Comercial in El Salvador, which has the fourth largest number of loans disbursed, 
are also large organizations. This suggests a potential for growth in their micro loan programs. 
Third, along with having the largest number of outstanding loans, the National Bank for 
Development in Egypt, the Bank Dangang Bali in Indonesia, and BancoSol and Caja de Ahorro y 
Credito Los Andes in Bolivia also disbursed the largest number of micro and small loans as well as 
the largest total volume of micro and small loans during the preceding year in their respective 
regions. Given differences in average loan size and terms that the various banks offer, however, 
these indicators have to be further examined. 
Fourth, one can usefully compare the number of loans disbursed to the number of loans outstanding. 
If the ratio is greater than one, the portfolio consists largely of loans with a term to maturity of less 
than a year. If the ratio is close to or equal to one, the portfolio's term structure is on average around 
one year in maturity. Finally, ifthe ratio is less than one, the bank has a portfolio of term loans 
longer than a year. Column 5 of Table 3.1 underscores the existence of two types of banks, those 
with a bias for longer-term loans and those emphasizing short-term loans in their microloan 
portfolio. A substantial majority of banks register ratios less than one, indicating a proclivity for 
longer-term loans. Only four banks, the National Bank for Development in Egypt, Centenary Bank 
in Uganda, and BancoSol and Caja de Ahorro y Credito Los Andes in Bolivia show ratios greater 
than one. Moreover, the ratios for the latter two are considerably greater than one, indicating a 
strong bias for shorter-term loans in these institutions. In summary, the results of a bias for longer-
term loans in the majority of these commercial banks is in sharp contrast to the shorter-term loans 
characteristic of most microlending NGOs. This is an indication of lack of adoption of typical 
microlending technologies. 
Fifth, it is important to recognize the proportion of micro and small loans in the total portfolio. On 
the one hand, this indicator reflects the degree to which the bank in question reaches a micro and 
small clientele among its customers. On the other hand, this proportion highlights the potential for 
growth for this loan category within the bank. With the exception of the large state-owned BRI, the 
figures reported in Table 3.2 (column 6) indicate that only a few banks have largely concentrated 
their lending portfolio in the microfinance area: the Family Finance Building Society in Kenya, the 
Centenary Bank in Uganda, Bank Dangang Bali in Indonesia, and BancoSol and Caja de Ahorro y 
Credito Los Andes in Bolivia. It is important to note that these organizations have been largely 
specialized in micro and small loans since their inception, either as microlending NGOs (BancoSol 
4 The statistics, self-reported by the banks, indicate both micro and small loans. For convenience 
of abbreviation, column headings in the tables merely use the term micro loans. This is reasonable 
in light of the fact that a large majority of the total number ofloans are micro loans. 
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and Los Andes) or as banks (the other three institutions). In addition, two of these organizations, 
namely Centenary Bank in Uganda and Caja de Ahorro y Credito Los Andes in Bolivia continue to 
receive substantial technical assistance from the German Consulting firm Interdisziplinare Projekt 
Consult (IPC) with regard to the provision of microfinancial services for the poor, while BancoSol 
benefited from technical assistance through a number of US AID-supported organizations (especially 
Accion International) to also reach the poor. 
Sixth, the majority of the large multi-service commercial banks, in constrast, have a very small share 
of their lending portfolio in this area: the National Bank for Development in Egypt, Banco Agricola 
Comercial in El Salvador, Banco Pacifico in Ecuador, Nova Scotia Bank in Guyana, and the 
Workers' Bank in Jamaica. Interestingly, however, most banks, whether having a large or a small 
share of their portfolio invested in micro lending, are using their own deposit base either to fully or 
partially support this activity. This implies that there may be a large growth potential for this micro 
loan category as it competes with more traditional banking products in the larger banks. As 
highlighted in the previous chapter, the degree to which these banks will allow more of their deposit 
base to support microlending will depend on the opportunity cost of using these deposits for 
microfinance compared to returns for use elsewhere in the bank. 
Seventh, the proportion of women borrowers in the micro and small loan portfolio reflects a 
dimension of the depth of the outreach of these organizations. Women are an important segment of 
the disadvantaged clientele. Again, figures in Table 3.2 (column 7) indicate that the experiences 
vary from reaching a majority of women clients in Bolivia by BancoSol, in Indonesia by the Bank 
Dangang Bali, in El Salvador by Banco Agricola Comercial, in Guyana by Scotia Enterprises, and 
in South Africa by Standard Bank, to reaching a smaller percentage of women in Egypt by the 
National Bank for Development, in Kenya by Family Finance Building Society, in Uganda by 
Centenary Bank, and in Guatemala by Banco Empresarial. More detailed field studies are required 
to identify the factors generating these gender differentials by institution. The differential targeting 
of certain market niches by occupation or activity (e.g. retail outlets in markets) and/or the product 
(group lending, short loan terms) could possibly explain these differences. 
B. Sustainability: Initial Cross Subsidization and Sources of Funding 
Microfinance units within these organizations are roughly divided evenly between integrated and 
separate entities. Integrated units standout in the smaller more specialized institutions while separate 
units are largely associated with the larger banks (Table 3.3 column 2). Initial cross subsidization 
of the microfinance unit for various periods of time was reported by all the organizations. To the 
extent that these programs later become profitable for the bank, it is inappropriate to refer to this 
strategy as subsidization; hence the term "initial" cross subsidization is used here. Most of the 
organizations are at least breaking-even now, if not making profits in their micro finance operations. 
A few programs which continue to be cross-subsidized have either faced some economic shocks, 
such as Banco del Pacifico in Ecuador, because of the country's recent civil disturbances, or it is still 
too early in the program's life, such as the Workers' Bank in Jamaica and Banco Empresarial in 
Guatemala, or because the microfinance activities are merged with other activities, such as consumer 
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and micro loans as in Banco Agricola Comercial in El Salvador. In the case of the Panabo Rural 
Bank in the Philippines, microfinance activities, although not separated from the bank's lending 
portfolio, were reported to be quite profitable. 
Initial cross-subsidization or grants have been used to cover initial sunk costs and operating costs 
typically for a period ranging between two to three years, as with the National Bank for Development 
in Egypt, Centenary Bank in Uganda, Family Finance Building Society in Kenya, Scotia Enterprise 
in Guyana, and Financiera Familiar in Paraguay. Other programs reported subsidizing their 
microfinance units for 3 years (in the case of Standard Bank in South Africa), 4 years (in the case 
ofMulticredit Bank in Panama), and up to 5 years (in the case of Banco Wiese in Peru). The former 
microlending NGOs that became a bank and afondo financiero privado in Bolivia (BancoSol and 
Caja Los Andes) are really not involved in cross-subsidization in the same sense as already 
established commercial banks, since their microloan portfolios are the basic mission of these 
institutions and they have only recently launched deposit-taking activity. These organizations 
required substantial donor subsidies, however, before becoming profitable. 
Most organizations did not have data readily available at the conference to indicate their average 
operating costs per loan (Table 3.3 column 5). The few that provided this information reported 
figures that varied from the single digits (such as 3 percent for Bank Dangang Bali), to the teens 
(such as 12 percent for Financiera Familiar and Bank Rakyat Indonesia, and 14 percent for Banco 
de! Desarrollo ), to the twenties (such as 20 percent for FFBS, 21 percent for Multicredit, and 23 
percent for Caja Los Andes), to the forties for the Centenary Bank. Several organizations that 
reported very high operating costs, Banco Empresarial in Guatemala (85 percent) and Banco del 
Pacifico in Ecuador, are among the few banks that appear not to be currently covering the costs of 
their microfinance activities. 
The majority of the organizations relied substantially on their own deposit base as a source of funds 
to launch microfinance activities, with the exception of Caja de Ahorro y Credito Los Andes in 
Bolivia and the National Bank for Development in Egypt. Some organizations, such as the BRI and 
Centenary Bank, however, have also benefited from donor-subsidized technical assistance effort~ 
that supported the build up of their microfinance activities while others, such as the Family Finance 
Building Society in Kenya and Centenary Bank in Uganda, also benefited from a small amount of 
donor fund contributions for on-lending (but these amounted to less than 10 percent of their micro 
loan portfolio). At the same time, donor funds targeted to microfinance were injected in a number 
of institutions for on-lending as well as to support initial operational costs until the programs break-
even. Among these institutions are the National Bank for Development in Egypt, Caja de Ahorro 
y Credito Los Andes in Bolivia, Financiera Familiar in Paraguay, and the Workers' Bank in Jamaica. 
Government rediscount lines were used extensively in some cases to supplement the partial use of 
own deposits, in Banco Agricola Comercial in El Salvador, Banco del Desarrollo in Chile ( 40 
percent of lending portfolio in each case), and to a lesser extent in other cases, such as the Bank 
Dangang Bali, Panabo Rural Bank and Banco del Pacifico (less than 10 percent in each case). In all 
cases where donor or government funds were drawn upon, these organizations also used their own 
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deposit base for their microfinance activities. The bank's deposit base carries the highest cost of 
funds when compared to donor and government resources. The effective interest rates for micro 
loans are sufficiently high, however, to cover the cost of funds as well as most operating costs. 
II. Organizational Structure and Regulation 
A. Governance Structure and Commitment 
All the organizations in the sample are private commercial banks with the exception of the Bank 
Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) which is a state-owned institution (Table 3.2, column 1).5 On the one hand, 
larger banks, such as the National Bank for Development in Egypt, Standard Bank in South Africa, 
Banco del Desarrollo in Chile, Banco Agricola Comercial in El Salvador, and the Workers' Bank 
in Jamaica, are characterized by a large number of shareholders (column 2). On the other hand, 
smaller banks, such as the Family Finance Building Society in Kenya, Bank Dangang Bali in 
Indonesia, Panabo Rural Bank in the Philippines, BancoSol and Caja Los Andes in Bolivia, 
Multicredit Bank in Panama, and Financiera Familiar in Paraguay, are characterized by a small 
number of shareholders. The trend exhibited by the banks under study reflects, on the one hand, a 
small degree of commitment to microfinance activities (proxied by the share of micro loans in the 
total portfolio) within the banks with many shareholders, mainly the large multi-service banks. The 
majority of the banks with few shareholders, i.e. the small and specialized banks, on the other hand, 
exhibit a modest to strong degree of commitment to their microfinance activities, as indicated in 
Table 3.2 (column 3). 
It should be noted that the number of years the banks have been active in the microfinance area does 
not seem to have a direct bearing on the degree of commitment to this activity. The experience of 
most private commercial banks in micro finance has only been recent, i.e. it covers only a handful 
of years (Table 3.2, column 4). Five out of the seven largest programs in Table 3.2 have a strong 
("extensive") commitment to microfinance lending (column 3). These are also programs with 
relatively longer institutional histories from 6 to 26 years. Four out of the six youngest programs (5 
years or less), which are also among the smaller-sized programs, also document an extensive 
commitment. Hence, neither age nor size of program are systematically associated with strength of 
commitment. Finally, one should still recognize that even a small share of microlending and limited 
5 Again, the term private commercial banks loosely refers to all the organizations discussed in 
this chapter except for Bank Rakyat Indonesia, which is a state-owned bank. While most of these 
banks are private commercial banks, one, Scotia Enterprise, is a subsidiary of the Nova Scotia Bank; 
another, Caja Los Andes, has a special private financial institution charter from Bolivian authorities 
which restricts dealing in international foreign exchange transactions and demand deposits but 
allows savings deposits; a third, FFBS, is a building society in Kenya while a fourth, Financiera 
Familiar in Paraguay, is a finance company with the right to offer savings services but not demand 
deposits. All these institutions fall under the regulatory authority for banks in their respective 
countries. 
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commitment can still generate a large number of micro clients in absolute numbers, as can be seen 
for the National Bank for Development in Egypt (35,850 clients) in column 3 of Table 3.1. 
It is not uncommon to find commercial banks and non-bank institutions engaged in microfinance as 
a result of significant donor support, both in terms of access to funds for on-lending at below market 
interest rates as well as free technical assistance, particularly during the first few years of the 
inception of these activities (Table 3.3, column 3). Whether few or many shareholders are involved, 
a number of organizations have started their microfinance programs based on donor support either 
in separate units or as an integrated part of the portfolio of the bank (Table 3.3, column 2). The 
National Bank for Development in Egypt and Workers' Bank in Jamaica received support from 
USAID to initiate their microfinance activities. Centenary Bank in Uganda and Caja de Ahorro y 
Credito Los Andes in Bolivia received support from GTZ, Financiera Familiar in Paraguay received 
support from the IDB, while the Banco del Desarrollo in Chile benefited from subsidized funds due 
to interest rebates from the government. Such support allows for an initial subsidy for these 
programs that, jointly with some of the banks' sunk costs, such as use of the existing infrastructure, 
utilities, and the bank's reputation gives an advantage to microfinance activities within these 
organizations until they break even. 
Several questions emerge from this use of donor resources and technical assistance to develop 
microfinance programs in banks: (1) what is the most efficient instrument for the subsidy (cheap 
funds, technical assistance, guarantees, etc.)?, (2) what is the most appropriate level of the subsidy 
and for how long should it be granted? In large part the answers depend on each banks peculiar 
needs to launch their respective programs. 
Finally, a number of bankers, particularly those from downscaling institutions attempting to 
incorporate microfinance services into their lending activities, agree that microfinance has a different 
culture than their traditional banking services. As noted in Chapter Two, this condition has pushed 
many bankers to create a separate microfinance unit and not integrate it within their traditional 
banking organization. This could have implications on the viability of this unit. A stand-alone 
operation is likely to be more costly than one that could be successfully integrated as a part of the 
bank's on-going branch lending. 
B. Regulatory Environment 
Table 2.2 in Chapter Two documented the regulatory environment in the countries in which these 
banks operate. With one exception, South Africa, all interest rates had been deregulated, creating 
the opportunity to freely charge the higher more realistic interest rates required for microlending. 
Moreover, these rates have allowed substantial intermediation margins for a number of these banks, 
as can be seen by comparing average deposit rates (in column 2 of Table 3.6) to effective microloan 
rates (in column 3). A portion of this margin is accounted for by reserve requirements on deposits. 
Reserve requirements were still high in Guatemala and El Salvador and elicited complaints from the 
banks operating there (see Table 3.1, column 1). 
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Reporting requirements and special reserves, although commonly perceived as a threat to stifle 
microfinance activities, did not raise burdensome requirements for the large banks represented in this 
study. For most large banks, additional conditions to be met for microfinance activities were not 
substantially burdensome to discourage microfinance initiatives. Moreover, with the exception of 
South Africa, where Standard Bank had to obtain permission to be exempt from the usury interest 
law, regulatory authorities did not impose any restrictions on the pricing of micro finance products. 6 
This may be due to the fact that microfinance lending has not reached levels that would attract 
regulatory interest or, in the larger banks, special reserves for undercollateralized loans can be 
currently handled internally at modest cost. However, there were some burdensome reporting 
requirements for smaller banks (e.g. Banco Empresarial in Guatemala). Moreover, former NGOs 
transforming themselves into banks (BancoSol and Caja Los Andes) did experience unusual scrutiny 
and review from authorities. This is not surprising, considering that these institutions were 
undertaking deposit activity for the first time. 
Maintaining a two-tiered interest rate structure was not always a simple process for most banks. 
High effective loan rates incorporated additional commissions, fees and even insurance policy 
premiums in some cases, reflecting the true cost of lending. Micro and small loan interest rates were 
generally higher than the commercial lending rates, as seen by comparing columns 3 and 5 in Table 
3.6. This was necessary to cover the higher cost of microfinance lending, as will be discussed 
subsequently. This two-tiered interest rate structure, however, was reported by a number of banks 
to be looked upon unfavorably by the clients and the community. This created an ongoing tension 
and potential threat from political and regulatory authorities in these countries. Standard Bank in 
South Africa was always experiencing this threat from the inception of its microcredit program. 
C. NGO Linkages 
It is clear that micro loans offered through commercial banks share some similarities with micro 
loans offered by non-bank NGOs. Moreover, the loan screening and monitoring tools used by these 
bankers (described in Chapter Two) have more in common with NGO screening and borrower moni-
toring tools than with traditional commercial lending practices. In some cases, part of the human 
capital training benefited from visits to some of the successful micro finance operations around the 
world such as BancoSol in Bolivia and ADEMI in the Dominican Republic. Some differences, 
nonetheless, exist such as the predominant use of individual loan technologies, larger loan sizes, and 
longer term structures that characterize commercial bank micro loans. It is not surprising, therefore, 
to find that the majority of the commercial banks have either established their own micro finance 
units or have integrated microfinancial services in their own portfolios rather than choosing to 
partner with NGOs. 
Only one bank, Banco Wiese in Peru, reported working directly through NGOs to disburse its micro 
loans. This bank allows the network of NGOs with which it operates to handle all the lending 
6 South Africa still maintains a usury interest law which prohibits banks from charging interest 
rates higher than ten percentage points above the prime rate. 
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processes. These downstream NGOs in Peru largely use a group lending methodology. The bank 
merely acts as a window for receiving loan repayments. Given the alleged extensive network of 
good NGOs in Peru, it was felt that NGOs had the expertise that would be difficult or costly for the 
bank staff to acquire. It is interesting to note that the bank leaves all the lending decisions to each 
of the 17 NGOs they work with while using its own deposit base to fund these micro loans. It is not 
surprising to note that the president of this family bank is behind this activity, which at present takes 
up about one tenth of the bank's total lending portfolio. 
Another bank, Banco Agricola Comercial in El Salvador, has been successful in incorporating indivi-
dual clients into its portfolio with a guarantee from NGOs in its lending areas. This represents an 
alternative way of incorporating NGOs into commercial bank microlending and appears particularly 
promising for NGOs familiar with individual loan technologies (and therefore individual clients). 
A number of banks stated they would feel uncomfortable dealing with NGO intermediaries in their 
countries since they knew very little about them. Nevertheless, the existence of a well-functioning 
NGO community successfully servicing poor clienteles could clearly offer some banks a less 
expensive and less demanding avenue to service low income clienteles with loans than necessarily 
choosing to undertake this task themselves (McGuire and Conroy, 1997). However, banks face an 
information problem here. They have to somehow discover good NGO candidate-partners and avoid 
weak organizations. An NGO rating agency could possibly reduce these information costs and 
increase social benefits through an expansion of microfinance services to these clienteles. The 
public good feature of a rating agency could justify the use of donor subsidies to support the 
development of the information base which in the end could elicit more NGO-bank linkages. 
D. Technical Assistance 
Technical assistance has played a very significant role in setting up the microfinance units, in edu-
cating and training staff members in these units, in transferring the microfinance technology to the 
banks, and in monitoring the progress of their operations for a period of time (Table 3.3, column 3). 
Typically, donors cover the costs of the technical assistance experts brought in to support the organi-
zation while learning about microfinance. The National Bank for Development, Centenary Bank, 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia, Caja de Ahorro y Credito Los Andes, Financiera Familiar, Banco Empre-
sarial, Banco del Pacifico, Banco del Desarrollo and the Workers' Bank are among the institutions 
which have benefited from technical assistance for periods of time ranging from a few years to as 
long as 10 years. Visiting non-bank NGO operations that have been in the microfinance business 
for some time has also been undertaken to educate bank managers about this area of finance. 
A number of organizations have experimented with different lending technologies such as group 
versus individual loans until they decided that individual loans were the most appropriate lending 
technology for their institutions. The technology transfer of micro financial products, therefore, is 
not exactly duplicated from one setting to another. Technical assistance, in some cases, works with 
local bank managers to reach a viable bank-specific model for delivering microfinancial services. 
In other cases, a number of organizations, such as the Family Finance Building Society, Bank 
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Dangang Bali, Panabo Rural Bank, Scotia Enterprise, Banco Agricola Comercial, and Multicredit 
Bank have established and managed their own microfinance units independently. 
E. Human Resources 
The case load or number of clients per loan officer was generally in the neighborhood of two to three 
hundred, although the range was from as few as 50 cases to as many as 1000 cases (Table 3.8 column 
5). Programs with low case loads had just recently launched operations. The unusually high loads 
are associated with long-standing programs operating in very densely settled areas. These numbers 
could vary among loan officers within the same bank, as performance-based remuneration schemes 
were used by a number of banks particularly for their microfinance activities. While the majority 
of the banks, the National Bank for Development, Centenary Bank, Bank Rakyat Indonesia, Bank 
Dangang Bali, Caja de Ahorro y Credito Los Andes, Scotia Enterprise, Financiera Familiar, Banco 
Empresarial, Multicredit Bank and Banco del Desarrollo, had staff incentive schemes, a few 
organizations that had a small number of credit officers did not feel it was necessary. 
Monthly remuneration (plus maximum bonuses) ranged from $100 for the National Bank for 
Development in Egypt to as high as $1,300 for Financiera Familiar in Paraguay (Table 3.8, column 
2). Most salary levels, reflecting diverse market conditions for bank-trained staff, fell between $250 
to $800 per month. Whether individual or team-based, remuneration incentives in some cases 
allowed loan officers to almost double their base salaries, as can be seen in comparing column 2 to 
column 1. In a few cases, bankers reported that this was a source of tension for other bank 
employees who did not receive these bonus remunerations. Most banks stated this was not yet a 
problem since the microfinance staff salaries plus their maximum incentives did not yet exceed the 
salaries of other bank employees. In some other cases, such as the National Bank for Development, 
Bank Dangang Bali, and Banco Empresarial, all bank staff received comparable remuneration or 
bonuses; thus, the potential for intra-bank tension among the staff did not exist. 
III. Microfinance Products and Technology 
A. Loan sizes, Maturity, and Interest Rates 
Micro loans are distinctly different from traditional bank loans. Commercial loans as well as con-
sumer loans are typically secured loans offered at interest rates that are lower than those associated 
with micro loans. These differences are significant among the more conservative large commercial 
banks such as the National Bank for Development in Egypt, Standard Bank in South Africa, Nova 
Scotia Bank in Guyana, Financiera Familiar in Paraguay, Banco Pacifico in Ecuador, and Banco del 
Desarrollo in Chile. Typically, these institutions offer micro loans through a separate window or part 
of the branch office that handles only these products and not through a common bank branch 
window. This allows both staff and clients to recognize the differences between the terms and condi-
tions of micro loans and commercial loans more clearly and reduces the confusion that might arise 
otherwise. The different microfinance culture, discussed earlier, also contributes to this arrangement. 
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Some banks, although offering micro loans distinct from commercial loans, nevertheless offer all 
their financial services at the same branches. This is the case for Family Finance Building Society 
in Kenya, Bank Dangang Bali in Indonesia, Panabo Rural Bank in the Philippines, Banco 
Empresarial in Guatemala, Multicredit Bank in Panama, and the Workers' Bank in Jamaica. Again, 
commercial loans at these organizations are collateralized and offered at interest rates lower than 
micro loan rates. 
Micro loans are generally provided with terms and conditions different from those associated with 
the traditional loans provided by private commercial banks (see Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6). Although 
these micro loans share some terms and conditions with the micro products provided by 
microlending NGOs, there are some significant differences. First, bank micro loans generally 
reported larger average and maximum size loans. Nevertheless, average loan sizes (based on volume 
of loans outstanding by number of active clients) among the 17 banks reviewed were lower than had 
been expected by the authors. Overall, they had an average loan size of less than $1,400. Two banks 
had average loan sizes under $300 and two banks at the upper end had loan sizes under $4,000. The 
breakdown among the 17 banks with microlending portfolios was as follows: 
Bank average loan size under $300 
Bank average loan size $301 to $1,000 
Bank average loan size $1,001 to $2,000 
Bank average loan size $2001 to $3,000 
Bank average loan size $3,001 to $4,000 
2 banks 
7 banks 
4 banks 
2 banks 
2 banks 
Second, although commercial banks offer micro loans with a minimum maturity as short as one to 
a few months, still some allow the maximum term for these loans to extend as long as two to four 
years (Table 3.5, column 2).7 As discussed earlier, examining the ratio of the number of loans 
disbursed to loans outstanding (Table 3.1, column 5) implies that the majority of these banks offer 
loans that typically extend for periods longer than one year. 
Third, the pricing of micro loans is set to cover the cost of making these loans, typically yielding 
higher effective interest rates than commercial loan rates as well as some NGO loan rates (Table 
3.6).8 Effective interest rates reported by bankers from various regions of the world ranged from 30 
to about 60 percent per annum (column 3, Table 3.6). Examining the real rates for both commercial 
and micro loans indicates positive and significantly higher rates for micro loans than for commercial 
7 Some banks allow maximum maturity of up to one year, such as the National Bank for 
Development, Panabo Rural Bank, Banco Empresarial and the Workers' Bank, while a few others 
extend the loan maturity up to two years such as Centenary Bank, Scotia Enterprise, and Financiera 
Familiar. Some banks offer a maximum micro loan term for as long as three, four or even five years. 
8 Effective micro loan interest rates presented in Table 3.7 were reported by the bank 
representatives during individual interviews. Different definitions of effective rates might have been 
used. 
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rates. This suggests it is, therefore, a necessary but not a sufficient condition to have positive real 
interest rates in an economy to allow banks to charge even higher rates to cover the cost of their 
microfinance activities. 
B. Repayment, Disbursement and Collateral 
Among the similarities between commercial bank and NGO micro loans is the frequent repayment 
schedule that banks seem to have adopted for their micro loans (Table 3.5 column 4). Bi-weekly, 
weekly, and even daily repayments are associated with micro loans in a number of institutions in 
addition to the more traditional monthly repayments. This shorter time period facilitates monitoring 
and is usually calibrated to the cash flow in the business. At the other end of the loan process is the 
significantly shorter time spent in processing micro loans, ranging from one to seven days (column 
3). This short disbursement time has been adopted by most organizations. The quick loan 
disbursement procedure is similar to the quick turnaround practiced by many microlending NGOs. 
It is noteworthy to mention that many organizations assume part of the transactions costs by going 
to their borrowers rather than requesting that their borrowers come to the branches, particularly 
during the loan processing period. 
Interestingly, some micro loans are offered without tangible collateral such as with the Panabo Rural 
Bank market vendor clientele in the Philippines, Family Finance Building Society loans that are 
below the equivalent of US$ I 00, and the micro loans at the National Bank for Development in 
Egypt. In general, uncollateralized micro loans are granted to clients who have been savers with their 
organizations for quite some time. Collateral foreclosure in case of default usually encounters 
lengthy and difficult legal procedures. Hence, many banks avoid foreclosure of collateral on 
defaulted loans. 
In summary, the downscaling private banks have implemented micro client products, services, and 
procedures that have been commonly adopted by non-bank microlending NGOs such as high, cost-
covering interest rates, flexible short term loans, frequent repayment schedules, minimal to no 
collateral, and quick disbursement practices. To some extent, key bank personnel likely adopted 
some of these products and procedures after having visited and evaluated the more successful NGO 
programs such as BancoSol in Bolivia or the successful micro lending division of Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia. On the other hand, a good many of these products and procedures are an inevitable 
consequence of trying to reach low income, low asset clienteles of the poor and near poor in 
developing countries. 
C. Lending Technology 
As micro loans represent a new product type for most commercial banks, new screening and 
monitoring tools have been adopted by these banks to evaluate and manage the risks involved. 
These tools are distinctly different from the collateralized small loans and consumer loan facilities 
that are offered simultaneously by some of the banks currently involved in microfinance. It is 
important to note, however, that with the exception of BancoSol, Scotia Enterprise and Banco Wiese, 
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a substantial majority of commercial banks engaged in microfinance are offering individual loans 
rather than group loans (Table 3.3, column 5). The Banco Empresarial in Guatemala also has a small 
pilot group loan program for market vendors in addition to their individual loan products. 
This individual micro loan technology largely characterizes downscaling organizations adding 
microloans as a new product line and stands in sharp contrast to the predominant group lending 
technology that characterizes many microlending NGOs in the world of microfinance. It should also 
be noted that this trend seems to have emerged as the principal type oflending for most commercial 
banks after some had experimented with group loans and largely abandoned them to concentrate on 
individual loan technologies. Among the reported difficulties with group loans were the costs of 
group formation, management, and high drop out rates. There are very few cases of any bank or non-
bank NGO being able to manage both individual and group loans simultaneously on any large scale. 
Conceivably, BancoSol, a preeminent group loan microlending NGO that became a bank in 1992, 
may become the first institution to succeed at this task given its already strong and well-established 
group loan technology and the fact that it is now engaged in a determined drive to also incorporate 
more individual loans with staff recruited from the banking industry in Bolivia. It is still problema-
tical whether an already established private commercial bank will ever move successfully into group 
loan products on a large scale. 
D. Deposit Services 
Data in Table 3.7 underscore the importance of deposit services for downscaling private banks. This 
stands out in contrast to the minor role of savings accounts in the one former NGO, non-bank insti-
tution, Caja de Ahorro y Credito Los Andes in Bolivia (Table 3.7, column l). However, it should 
be noted that Caja Los Andes has only recently begun to mobilize savings under its new charter 
which now allows it to capture deposits. The relatively large number of savings accounts below 
$500 (Table 3.7, column 3) indicates that deposit services are also contributing substantially to the 
outreach performance of these institutions. Indeed, there are many more micro client depositors 
evident in column 3 of Table 3. 7 than there are micro borrowers in column 1 of Table 3. I. It is of 
interest to note the rapid increase in savings accounts in BancoSol to almost 46,000 accounts. This 
is a creditable performance when one keeps in mind that up to 1992, BancoSol was a credit-only 
NGO with no deposit services. 
Compulsory savings (Table 3.7, column 4) are enforced for clients with micro loans by only a few 
banks, namely the National Bank for Development in Egypt, Family Finance Building Society, 
Scotia Enterprise, and Banco del Desarrollo. These institutions require their borrowers to deposit 
a part of their loans in a savings account, ranging from 10 percent at the National Bank for Develop-
ment in Egypt up to 30 percent for large loans at Scotia Enterprise in Guyana. Savings, in other 
cases, are used partially in the loan screening and monitoring process. While Family Finance 
Building Society in Kenya does require that all borrowers be savers for at least six months, other 
organizations such as the Bank Dangang Bali and Panabo Rural Bank in the Philippines do not 
require borrowers to save, but nevertheless independently encourage savings (Table 3.7, column 5). 
The Bank Dangang Bali, along with Banco Empresarial, Multicredit Bank, Standard Bank, and 
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Centenary Bank, have either individual savings incentives such as lotteries, very low minimum 
balance requirements, or overall rewards for bank managers for successful savings promotion. The 
Bank Dangang Bali, Panabo Rural Bank, and Family Finance Building Society, among others, 
reported that savings provide information about prospective borrowers which makes loan screening 
and monitoring procedures somewhat less difficult and more efficient. 
E. Screening and Monitoring 
Typical screening techniques of micro clienteles receiving individual loan services involve credit 
officers making personal reference checks about prospective borrowers with informed individuals 
in the communities, with suppliers in the markets, and with other informal as well as formal lenders 
in some cases. Inspecting the business premises and the borrower's residence are also important 
means of verifying information and marking permanent locations for the borrowers. Cash flow 
analysis of the business and expenditure flow documentation of the household establishes the 
parameters within which feasible loan repayments can be scheduled. These business and household 
analyses of cash flow are essential features of the lending technology since collateral is less impor-
tant in screening these clienteles. In most cases, this screening process is done on an individual 
basis. Nevertheless, in the case of the Panabo Rural Bank in the Philippines, micro loans made to 
vendors in the market are screened in a batch processing format where the loan officer verifies 
information with market suppliers and other lenders for a whole list of borrowers at the same time. 
Loan repayments are also used as an indicator in screening for repeat borrowers. In cases such as 
Centenary Bank, Caja de Ahorro y Credito Los Andes, and Financiera Familiar borrowers who have 
fully repaid two to three loans on time get access to an automatic line of credit thereby reducing 
lending costs substantially for this repeat borrower clientele . 
Borrower monitoring techniques are largely aided by daily, weekly, bi-weekly or monthly repayment 
schedules generated by computerized loan tracking systems (see column 4 of Table 3.5). Most banks 
stated that an effective software computer technology is essential to track and monitor loan 
repayments once the micro loan program grows beyond a rudimentary scale of activity. Loan officers 
conduct follow ups through telephone calls and personal visits in case of even one-day 
delinquencies. These measures are taken very seriously since many micro loans are granted with 
little to no collateral. In those cases when physical collateral is required for small loans (rather than 
micro loans), such as with Centenary Bank, Family Finance Building Society, Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia, and Bank Dangang Bali, the latter three reported that these loans were rarely foreclosed 
in cases of delinquency because of lengthy and costly legal procedures. Centenary Bank, due to 
recently improved contract enforcement rules in Uganda, has been more successful in foreclosing 
on collateral and pursuing bad debtors. 
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Table 3.1 Selected Indicators of Micro Loan Numbers and Volumes by Banks Ranked by 
Number of Micro Loans Outstanding by Region 1995-96. 
Region/ Banks' Total No. Total Vol. Total No. Total Vol. ML No. of Vol. of 
Country ML Out. ML Out. MLDisb. Disb. USS Disb./Out Disb./Out 
(Col3/I) (Col 4/2) 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AFRICA 
I. Egypt NBD 20,852 13.5M 35,830 43.5M l.72 3.45 
2. Kenya FFBS 6,000 1.4M 5,500 800,000 0.92 0.57 
3. Uganda CERUDEB 3,900 5.8M 4,593 8.4M 1.18 l.45 
4. S. Africa Standard 226 138,000 None None n.a. n.a. 
ASIA 
5. Indonesia BRI 2.40M l.60 BS n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
6. Indonesia BOB 13,133 43.IM 10,934 35.2M 0.83 0.82 
7. Philippines Panabo 1,602 l.61M 1,474 l.4M 0.92 0.87 
LATIN 
AMERICA 
8. Bolivia BancoSol 57,745 30.2M 140,864 80.9M 2.44 2.68 
9. Bolivia Los Andes 17,854 8.62M 36,998 21.8M 3.08 2.53 
10. Chile Desarrollo 17,500 17.6M n.a. 21M n.a. l.19 
11. El Salvador Agricola 9,305 14.8M 3,741 9M 0.40 0.61 
12. Guyana Scotia 9,000 l.2M 4,836 935,647 0.54 0.78 
13. Peru Wiese 4,760 19M 3,818 ISM 0.80 0.79 
14. Paraguay Finan. Fam. 4,658 4.5M 2,935 3.2M 0.63 0.71 
15. Ecuador Pacifico 4,000 4M 250 160,000 0.06 0.04 
16. Panama Multicredit 1,450 8.6M n.a. 7M n.a. 0.81 
17. Guatemala Empresarial 840 2M 788 n.a. 0.93 n.a. 
18. Jamaica Workers 177 3.3M 177 3.36M l.00 l.03 
Source: Information presented in this report is based on data reported by the respective banks before the Commercial Banks in Microfinance 
Conference, Washington, D.C., November 18-20, 1996, as well as from interviews conducted with all the bank representatives during the conti:rence. 
Information for BancoSol in Bolivia comes from C. Gonzalez-Vega et al. "The Challenge of Growth for Microfinance Organizations: The Case ofBanco 
Solidario in Bolivia" in Hartmut Schneider (Editor) Microfinace for the Poor? IFAD-OECD, Paris, 1997 (Data as of June, 1995). 
Note a: Names of banks: (I) NBD is the National Bank for Development; (2) FFBS is the Family Finance Building Society; (3) CERUDEB is 
Centenary Bank; (4) Standard is Standard Bank; (5) BRI is Bank Rakyat Indonesia; (6) BOB is Bank Dangang Bali; (7) Panabo is Panabo 
Rural Bank; (8)BancoSol is Banco Solidario; (9) Los Andes is Caja Los Andes; ( 10) Desarrollo is Banco de Desarrollo;( 11) Agricola is Banco 
Agricola Commercial; (12) Scotia is Scotia Enterprise (Subsidiary ofBank ofNova Scotia); (13) Wiese is Banco Wiese; (14) Finan. Fam. 
is Financiera Familiar;( 15) Pacifico is Banco del Pacifico; ( 16) Multicredit is Multicredit Bank; ( 17) Empresarial is Banco Empresarial; ( 18) 
Workers is Workers' Bank. 
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Table 3.2 Operating Charter, Type of Bank, and Degree of Commitment to Microlending 
hi Banks Ranked hi Number of Micro Loans Outstanding hi Region 1995-96. 
Region/ Banks' Type of Charter TypeofBank Degree of Years ML UseofOwn o/oMLin %Females in 
Country Commitment Active Deposit Total Portfolio Portfolio 
Base(%) 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (S) (6) (7) 
AFRICA 
I. Egypt NBD Pvt. Comm. Bank Many S. holders Small 7 20 3.7 13 
2. Kenya FFBS Non-Bank Bldg. Few S. holders Extensive 12 9S 8S II 
Soc. 
3. Uganda CERUDEB Pvt. Comm. Bank Few S. holders Extensive 3 90 83 29 
4. S. Africa Standard Pvt. Comm. Bank Many S. holders Negligible 4 100 Negligible 8S 
ASIA 
S. Indonesia BRI State Bank Few S. holders Extensive 12 100 Majority 2S 
6. Indonesia BOB Pvt. Comm. Bank Few S. holders Extensive 26 83 49 Majority 
7. Philippines Panabo Pvt. Rural Bank Few S. holders Modest 12 70 27 so 
LATIN 
AMERICA 
8. Bolivia BancoSol Pvt. Comm. Bank Few S. holders Extensive S(as NGO) 6S JOO 68 
4(as Bank) 
9. Bolivia Los Andes Pvt. Non-Bank Few S. holders Extensive S(as NGO) 0 100 63 
l(as Bank) 
JO.Chile Desarrollo Pvt. Comm. Bank Many S. holders Modest 6 60 Small so 
11. El Salvador Agricola Pvt. Comm. Bank Many S. holders Small 10 60 3.3 Majority 
12. Guyana Scotia Intl. Finance Unit Subsidiary Extensive 3 JOO 9 80 
13. Peru Wiese Pvt. Comm. Bank Few S. holders Modest s 100 10 4S 
14. Paraguay Finan. Fam. Pvt. Non-Bank Few S. holders Extensive 2 so 20 so 
IS. Ecuador Pacifico Pvt. Comm. Bank Many S. holders Small 23 9S 2 40 
16. Panama Multicredit Pvt. Comm. Bank Few S. holders Small 5 100 10 3S 
17. Guatemala Empresarial Pvt. Comm. Bank Few S. holders Extensive 3 100 II 10 
18. Jamaica Workers Pvt. Comm. Bank Many S. holders Small 2 na 4.5 na 
Source: Information presented in this report is based on data reported by the respective banks before the Commercial Banks in Microfinance 
Conference, Washington, D.C., November 18-20, 1996, as well as from interviews conducted with all the bank representatives during the conference. 
BancoSol data from Gonzalez-Vega et.al., op.cit. 
Note a: Names of banks: (I) NBD is the National Bank for Development; (2) FFBS is the Family Finance Building Society; (3) CERUDEB is 
Centenary Bank; (4) Standard is Standard Bank; (S) BRI is Bank Rakyat Indonesia; (6) BOB is Bank Dangang Bali; (7) Panabo is Panabo 
Rural Bank; (8) BancoSol is Banco Solidario; (9) Los Andes is Caja Los Andes; (I 0) Desarrollo is Banco de Desarrollo;( 11) Agricola is 
Banco Agricola Commercial; ( 12) Scotia is Scotia Enterprise (Subsidiary ofBank of Nova Scotia); ( 13) Wiese is Banco Wiese; ( 14) Finan. 
Fam. is Financiera Familiar; (IS) Pacifico is Banco del Pacifico;( 16) Multicredit is Multicredit Bank; ( 17) Empresarial is Banco Empresarial; 
(18) Workers is Workers' Bank. 
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Table 3.3 
Region/ 
Country 
AFRICA 
I. Egypt 
2. Kenya 
3. Uganda 
4. S. Africa 
ASIA 
S. Indonesia 
6. Indonesia 
7. Philippines 
LATIN 
AMERICA 
8. Bolivia 
9. Bolivia 
10.Chile 
I I .El Salvador 
12.Guyana 
13. Peru 
14. Paraguay 
15. Ecuador 
16. Panama 
17. Guatemala 
18. Jamaica 
Origin and Organization of Microlending Activity by Banks Ranked by 
Number of Micro Loans Outstanding by Region 1995-96. 
Banks" 
NBD 
FFBS 
CERUDEB 
Standard 
BRI 
BDB 
Panabo 
BancoSol 
Los Andes 
Desarrollo 
Agricola 
Scotia 
Wiese 
Finan. Fam. 
Pacifico 
Multicredit 
Empresarial 
Workers 
Origin Organization 
(I) (2) 
Downscaling Separate unit 
Original mission Integrated 
Downscaling Integrated 
Downscaling Separate unit 
Downscaling Separate unit 
Original mission Integrated 
Original mission Integrated 
Original mission Integrated 
Original mission Integrated 
Downscaling Separate unit 
Downscaling Separate unit 
Downscaling Separate unit 
Downscaling Via NGO 
Downscaling Separate unit 
Downscaling Separate unit 
Downscaling Integrated 
Downscaling Integrated 
Downscaling Integrated 
Technical 
Assistance 
(3) 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Y~s 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Technology 
(4) 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
Group 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
Group 
Predm. Group 
Individual 
Individual 
Individual 
Predm. 
Individual 
Individual 
Operating 
Costs/Loans 
out.(%) 
n.a. 
20 
40 
n.a. 
12 
3 
n.a. 
27 
23 
14 
2 
n.a. 
n.a. 
12 
High 
21 
85 
n.a. 
(S) 
Source: Information presented in this report is based on data reported by the respective banks before the Commercial Banks in Microfinance 
Conference, Washington, D.C., November 18-20, 1996, as well as from interviews conducted with all the bank representatives during the conference. 
BancoSol data from Gonzalez-Vega et.al., op.cit. 
Note a: Names of banks: (I) NBD is the National Bank for Development; (2) FFBS is the Family Finance Building Society; (3) CERUDEB is 
Centenary Bank; (4) Standard is Standard Bank; (S) BRI is Bank Rakyat Indonesia; (6) BDB is Bank Dangang Bali; (7) Panabo is Panabo 
Rural Bank;(8)BancoSol is Banco Solidario; (9) Los Andes is Caja Los Andes; 10) Desarrollo is Banco de Desarrollo;( 11) Agricola is Banco 
Agricola Commercial; (12) Scotia is Scotia Enterprise (Subsidiary ofBank of Nova Scotia); (13) Wiese is Banco Wiese; (14) Finan. Fam. 
is Financiera Familiar; (IS) Pacifico is Banco del Pacifico; ( 16) Multicredit is Multicredit Bank; ( 17) Empresarial is Banco Empresarial; ( 18) 
Workers is Workers' Bank. 
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Table 3.4 Selected Indicators of Micro Loan Sizes by Banks Ranked by Number of Micro 
Loans Outstanding by Region, 1995-96. 
Region/ Banks" Min. Max Size Reported Estimated Ave. Estimated Ave. Ave. 
Country Size$ $ Ave. Size$ ML Size($) ML Size($) Outstanding 
Disbursed Outstanding MU GDP per 
Capita 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AFRICA 
I. Egypt NBD 70 3,000 588 1,186 599 0.83 
3. Kenya FFBS 100 900 446 145 233 0.93 
3. Uganda CERUDEB 100 5,000 1,200 1,828 1,487 7.80 
4. S. Africa Standard 500 1,300 1,300 n.a. 610 0.20 
ASIA 
5. Indonesia BRI II 11,000 500 n.a. 666 0.76 
6. Indonesia BOB 500 25,000 3,320 3,219 3,282 3.73 
7. Philippines Panabo 200 2,000 1,000 949 1,004 1.06 
LATIN 
AMERICA 
8. Bolivia BancoSol 20 3,000 550 575 522 0.67 
9. Bolivia Los Andes 10 42,000 580 589 482 0.62 
10. Chile Desarrollo 800 6,385 1,200 n.a. 1,005 0.28 
11. El Salvador Agricola 60 23,000 n.a. 2,405 1,590 2.27 
12. Guyana Scotia 108 7,195 500 193 133 0.25 
13. Peru Wiese 1,000 10,000 6,857 3,929 3,991 1.89 
14. Paraguay Finan. Fam. 400 6,500 n.a. 1,090 966 0.61 
15. Ecuador Pacifico 1,000 30,000 1,000 640 1,000 0.78 
16. Panama Multicredit 200 50,000 n.a. n.a. 593 0.23 
17 .Guatemala Empresarial 2,000 10,000 n.a. n.a. 2,380 1.98 
18. Jamaica Workers 142 3,428 n.a. 13,333 12,994 8.44 
Source: Information presented in this report is based on data reported by the respective banks before the Commercial Banks in Microfinance 
Conference, Washington, D.C., November 18-20, 1996, as well as from interviews conducted with all the bank representatives during the conference. 
BancoSol data from Gonzalez-Vega et.al., op.cit. 
Note a: Names of banks: (I) NBD is the National Bank for Development; (2) FFBS is the Family Finance Building Society; (3) CERUDEB is 
Centenary Bank; (4) Standard is Standard Bank; (5) BRI is Bank Rakyat Indonesia; (6) BOB is Bank Dangang Bali; (7) Panabo is Panabo 
Rural Bank(8) BancoSol is Banco Solidario; (9) Los Andes is Caja Los Andes; I 0) Desarrollo is Banco de Desarrollo;( 11) Agricola is Banco 
Agricola Commercial; ( 12) Scotia is Scotia Enterprise (Subsidiary of Bank of Nova Scotia); ( 13) Wiese is Banco Wiese; ( 14) Finan. Fam. 
is Financiera Familiar; ( 15) Pacifico is Banco de! Pacifico;( 16) Multicredit is Multicredit Bank; ( 17) Empresarial is Banco Empresarial; ( 18) 
Workers is Workers' Bank. 
ML = microloan. 
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Table 3.5 Selected Indicators of Micro Loan Maturities, Disbursement Periods and 
Repayment Schedules by Banks Ranked by Number of Micro Loans 
Outstanding by Region 1995-96. 
Region/ Banks" Min. Term (months) Max. Term (months) Loan Repayment Schedule 
Country Disbursement 
(Days) 
(I) (2) (3) (4) 
AFRICA 
I. Egypt NBD 12 2-5 wk./month 
2. Kenya FFBS 6 36 Few month. 
3. Uganda CERUDEB 3 18 6-7 wk./month 
4. S. Africa Standard 9 36 5-7 month 
ASIA 
5. Indonesia BRI 6 36 n.a. month/seas. 
6. Indonesia BDB 36 1-3 daily/month 
7. Philippines Panabo 3 12 n.a. wk./month/qrtr. 
LATIN 
AMERICA 
BancoSol 36 3-7 weekly/bi-wk./monthly 
8. Bolivia 
9. Bolivia Los Andes 1.5 24-48 3-4 bi-weekly 
10. Chile Desarrollo 36 2-5 month 
I I.El Salvador Agricola 12 72 n.a. monthly 
12. Guyana Scotia 4 24 3-7 bi-weekly 
13. Peru Wiese 60 n.a. weekly 
14. Paraguay Finan. Fam. 12 24 1-2 wk./month 
15. Ecuador Pacifico 12 48 n.a. month 
16. Panama Mui tiered it 4 36 8 bi-wk. /month 
17. Guatemala Empresarial 12 3 daily/month 
18. Jamaica Workers 3.5 10 n.a. weekly 
Source: Information presented in this report is based on data reported by the respective banks before the Commercial Banks in Microfinance 
Conference, Washington, D.C., November 18-20, 1996, as well as from interviews conducted with all the bank representatives during the conference. 
BancoSol data from Gonzalez-Vega et al.., op. cit. 
Note a: Names ofbanks: (I) NBD is the National Bank for Development; (2) FFBS is the Family Finance Building Society; (3) CERUDEB is 
Centenary Bank; (4) Standard is Standard Bank; (5) BRI is Bank Rakyat Indonesia; (6) BOB is Bank Dangang Bali; (7) Panabo is Panabo 
Rural Bank;(8) BancoSol is Banco Solidario; (9) Los Andes is Caja Los Andes; ( 10) Desarrollo is Banco de Desarrollo;( 11) Agricola is Banco 
Agricola Commercial; (12) Scotia is Scotia Enterprise (Subsidiary of Bank of Nova Scotia); (13) Wiese is Banco Wiese; (14) Finan. Fam. 
is Financiera Familiar; ( 15) Pacifico is Banco del Pacifico; (16) Multicredit is Multicredit Bank; ( 17) Empresarial is Banco Empresarial; ( 18) 
Workers is Workers' Bank. 
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Table 3.6 Interest Rates and Selected Performance Indicators for Banks Engaged in 
Microenterprise Lending by Banks Ranked by Number of Micro Loans 
Outstanding by Region 1995-96. 
Region/ Banks' Reserve Deposit ML Real Comm. Operating Loan 
Country Req. (%) Rate Effective Effective Rates Costs/Loans Loss/Portfolio 
Rates ML Rate Out. Arrears(%) 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
AFRICA 
I. Egypt NBD 25 II 30%p.a. 20.2 17 n.a. 5 (LL) 
3. Kenya FFBS 20 17 34%p.a. 20.6 32 20 2 (LL) 
3. Uganda CERUDEB 15 10 46%p.a. 36.6 46 40 10 (LL) 
4. S. Africa Standard 14 50%p.a. 39.4 17 n.a. 19 (LL) 
ASIA 
5. Indonesia BRI 3 17 32%p.a. 23.0 22 12 I (LL) 
6. Indonesia BDB 3 17 30%p.a. 21.2 24 3 5 (LL) 
7. Philippines Panabo 9 9 40%p.a. 30.8 32 n.a. 2 (LL) 
LATIN 
AMERICA 
8. Bolivia BancoSol 10 7 48%p.a. n.a. N.A. 27 6(LL) 
9. Bolivia Los Andes 10 7 3.5% p.m. n.a. N.A. 23 7 (LL) 
10. Chile Desarrollo 8 13 3.7% p.m. n.a. 2 p.m. 14 4 (LL) 
.. I I .El Salvador Agricola 35 14 2 5 (I day) 
12.Guyana Scotia 20 12 25% p.a. n.a. N.A. n.a. I (LL) 
13. Peru Wiese 10-15 15 41%p.a. 26.I 16 p.a. n.a. 4.5 (LL) 
14. Paraguay Finan. Fam. 15 18 6%p.m. n.a. 7.3 p.m. 12 6 (LL) 
IS.Ecuador Pacifico IO 45 57% p.a. 27.2 48 p.a. High 6. 7 (30 days) 
2 (LL) 
16. Panama Multicredit I0-15 7 32% p.a. 30.7 17 p.a. 21 6.5 (30 days) 
6 (LL) 
17.Guatemala Empresarial 36 8 30% p.a. 16.8 23 p.a. 85 5 (30 days) 
18. Jamaica Workers 11 27 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: Information presented in this report is based on data reported by the respective banks before the Commercial Banks in Microfinance 
Conference, Washington, D.C., November 18-20, 1996, as well as from interviews conducted with all the bank representatives during the conference. 
BancoSol data from Gonzalez-Vega et al., op. cit. 
Note a: Names ofbanks: (I) NBD is the National Bank for Development; (2) FFBS is the Family Finance Building Society; (3) CERUDEB is 
Centenary Bank; (4) Standard is Standard Bank; (5) BRI is Bank Rakyat Indonesia; (6) BDB is Bank Dangang Bali; (7) Panabo is Panabo 
Rural Bank;(8) BancoSol in Banco Solidario b) N.A. means not applicable; n.a. means not available. (9) Los Andes is Caja Los Andes; 10) 
Desarrollo is Banco de Desarrollo;( 11) Agricola is Banco Agricola Commercial; ( 12) Scotia is Scotia Enterprise (Subsidiary ofBank ofNova 
Scotia); (13) Wiese is Banco Wiese; (14) Finan. Fam. is Financiera Familiar; (15) Pacifico is Banco del Pacifico;(l6) Multicredit is 
Multicredit Bank; ( 17 Empresarial is Banco Empresarial; ( 18) Workers is Workers' Bank. 
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' 
Table 3.7 Selected Data on Deposit Activities for Banks Engaged in Micro Lending 
Activity by Banks Ranked by Number of Micro Loans Outstanding by Region 
1995-96. 
Region/ Banks" Total No. of Vol. ofSav. No. ofSav. Require Sav. Special Sav. 
Country Sav. Accts. Accts. USS Accts. <500 For Loans Incentives 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
AFRICA 
I. Egypt NBD 20,852 l.7M 14,031 Yes n.a. 
2. Kenya FFBS 22,500 5.8M 18,000 Yes Yes 
3. Uganda CERUDEB 60,900 9.3M 42,000 No Yes 
4. S. Africa Standard 287,786 20M No E-plan 
ASIA 
5. Indonesia BRI 15.6M 2.SBS majority No Yes 
6. Indonesia BOB 344,619 105M 315,934 No Yes 
7. Philippines Panabo I0,019 34.6M 9,834 No Yes 
LATIN 
AMERICA 
8. Bolivia BancoSol 45,911 n.a. most accts. No No 
9. Bolivia Los Andes 360 l.2M 208 No No 
10. Chile Desarrollo Yes No 
I I .El Salvador Agricola 50,459 13.3M 38,169 No Yes 
• 12.Guyana Scotia 2,700 N.A. 2,670 Yes N.A. 
13. Peru Wiese N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
14. Paraguay Finan. Fam. 1,100 13.SM 400 No No 
15. Ecuador Pacifico 8,000 n.a. n.a. No No 
16. Panama Multicredit 1,750 145.3M 1200 No Yes 
17. Guatemala Empresarial 20,000 33M I0,461 No Yes 
18. Jamaica Workers n.a. SIM 90,000 n.a. n.a. 
Source: Information presented in this report is based on data reported by the respective banks before the Commercial Banks in Microfinance 
Conference, Washington, D.C., November 18-20, 1996, as well as from interviews conducted with all the bank representatives during the conference. 
Note a: Names of banks: (I) NBD is the National Bank for Development; (2) FFBS is the Family Finance Building Society; (3) CERUDEB is 
Centenary Bank; (4) Standard is Standard Bank; (5) BRI is Bank Rakyat Indonesia; (6) BOB is Bank Dangang Bali; (7) Panabo is Panabo 
Rural Bank; (8)BancoSol is Banco Solidario; b: N.A. =not applicable; n.a.=not available;(9) Los Andes is Caja Los Andes; (10) Desarrollo 
is Banco de Desarrollo;( 11) Agricola is Banco Agricola Commercial; ( 12) Scotia is Scotia Enterprise (Subsidiary ofBank of Nova Scotia); 
( 13) Wiese is Banco Wiese; (14) Finan. Fam. is Financiera Familiar; ( 15) Pacifico is Banco del Pacifico;( 16) Multicredit is Multicredit Bank; 
(17 Empresarial is Banco Empresarial; (18) Workers is Workers' Bank. 
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Table 3.8 Human Resource Indicators for Banks Engaged in Micro Lending Activity by 
Banks Ranked by Number of Micro Loans Outstanding by Region 1995-96. 
Region/ Banks' Base Salary Salary plus Max. No. of Credit No. of other Case Load ML 
Country per Month$ Incentive/month $ Officers Employees (Clients per Incentive 
Loan Officer) System 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
AFRICA 
I. Egypt NBD 50 100 240 160 400 Both 
3. Kenya FFBS 535 N.A. 16 24 375 None 
3. Uganda CERUDEB 300 600 192 n.a. 123 lndvl. 
4. S. Africa Standard 652 N.A. 3 N.A. 250 None 
ASIA 
5. Indonesia BR! 275 350 50% 50% 450 Team 
6. Indonesia BDB 200 250 37 221 1000 Both 
7. Philippines Panabo 200 N.A. N.A. 300 None 
LATIN 
AMERICA 
8. Bolivia BancoSol 345 345 183 119 402 None 
9. Bolivia Los Andes 400 800 54 n.a. 700 lndvl. 
10. Chile Desarrollo 400 560 84 37 325 Both 
I I .El Salvador Agricola 457 N.A. 4 N.A. None 
12.Guyana Scotia 250 250 3 2 350 lndvl. 
13. Peru Wiese 1,500 N.A. II N.A. N.A. None 
14. Paraguay Finan. Fam. 600 1,300 20 5 250 lndvl. 
15. Ecuador Pacifico 200-600 N.A. 80Total n.a. 250 None 
16. Panama Multicredit 450 600 21 21 90 lndvl. 
17. Guatemala Empresarial 100 N.A. 8 n.a. 50 lndvl. 
18. Jamaica Workers n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: Information presented in this report is based on data reported by the respective banks before the Commercial Banks in Microfinance 
Conference, Washington, D.C., November 18-20, 1996, as well as from interviews conducted with all the bank representatives during the conference. 
Note a: Names of banks: (I) NBD is the National Bank for Development; (2) FFBS is the Family Finance Building Society; (3) CERUDEB is 
Centenary Bank; (4) Standard is Standard Bank; (5) BRI is Bank Rakyat Indonesia; (6) BDB is Bank Dangang Bali; (7) Panabo is Panabo 
Rural Bank; (8) BancoSol is Banco Solidario;(9) Los Andes is Caja Los Andes; (I 0) Desarrollo is Banco de Desarrollo;( 11) Agricola is Banco 
Agricola Commercial; (12) Scotia is Scotia Enterprise (Subsidiary of Bank of Nova Scotia); (13) Wiese is Banco Wiese; (14) Finan. Fam. 
is Financiera Familiar; ( 15) Pacifico is Banco del Pacifico; ( 16) Multicredit is Multicredit Bank ( 17) Empresarial is Banco Empresarial; ( 18) 
Workers is Workers' Bank. 
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• 
CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
I. Conclusions 
The experiences of private commercial banks in microfinance are still relatively limited. 
Nonetheless, a few patterns are emerging and a number of challenges continue to require attention. 
First, the current outreach of commercial banks in microfinance is at best modest in scope. Some 
of the banks, such as Centenary Bank in Uganda, BancoSol in Bolivia, Scotia Enterprise in Guyana, 
and Banco del Desarrollo in Chile, have exhibited impressive growth rates in a short time. 
Second, most commercial banks are largely using their own deposit base for micro loans. Donor 
funds and government rediscount lines still represent cheaper sources of funds for a number of 
organizations, but some conditions and limitations restrict unlimited use of these resources. 
Although all organizations started by cross-subsidizing microfinance units and activities for various 
periods of time, currently good repayment rates and high effective interest rates that far exceed the 
cost of funds allow most organizations to at least break even in the use of their own funds for 
micro lending. 
Third, commitment to microfinance among commercial banks appears to be more likely in small, 
specialized institutions with few shareholders, or in large institutions which have created an indepen-
dent unit or subsidiary dedicated exclusively to microfinance. In both of these cases, financial 
products and technologies can be adapted to the microenterprise or low-income client. Based on the 
evidence, two other modalities, adding microfinance to small and medium enterprise officer 
portfolios or maintaining a microenterprise unit within an overall bank structure, did not appear to 
work as well. 
Fourth, micro finance within commercial banks is largely attributed to the effort of a single or a small 
number of persons to promote these activities. Some of these individuals have been close to and 
aware of the NGO operations in microfinance. With few exceptions (e.g. Bank Dagang Bali, 
Financiera Familiar), microfinance in commercial banks has seldom been based strictly on profit-
seeking motives. 
Fifth, currently prudential regulation with two to three exceptions does not seem to discourage 
microfinance activities in most of these banks. No additional requirements, other than what is 
typically reported by commercial banks to the supervisory authorities, are requested of commercial 
banks because of their microfinance activities. The larger commercial banks are able to engage in 
sufficient self-provisioning to manage these activities properly. Most banks have the flexibility to 
price their products to break-even and cover their costs as well as make profits. Reporting, however, 
has been reported as burdensome in two cases among the smaller, more specialized banks. In addi-
tion one must note the special case of the two former microlending NGOs (BancoSol and Caja Los 
Andes), which transformed themselves into regulated financial institutions. These institutions had 
to adapt to a more rigorous reporting regime than previously. However, this represents a natural shift 
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in regulatory standards as they moved from being credit-only NGOs to become deposit-taking 
institutions. 
Sixth, commercial banks are offering micro loans that are different from their typical collateralized 
commercial and consumer loans. These micro loans, although sharing some similarities with NGO 
micro loan products, such as frequent repayments and quick and inexpensive disbursements are 
however, slightly larger in size and are granted for longer maturities than typical NGO loans. 
Moreover, micro loans provided by commercial banks are granted with different terms and 
conditions than traditional bank loans. This is evident from the fact that micro loans are offered by 
some commercial banks in separate locations from their traditional banking services, which helps 
bankers highlight the differences between their products. Higher interest rate charges and less 
rigorous collateral requirements stand out here for most banks. 
Seventh, with the exception of BancoSol, Scotia Enterprise, and the Banco Wiese NGOs, 
commercial bank micro loans are largely provided on an individual basis rather than through a group 
lending technology. This individual lending trend stands in contrast to the group lending technology 
that many microlending NGOs have adopted. 
Eighth, given that some important differences in operational practices exist between standard 
commercial bank and NGO micro loans, it was not surprising to find that bank-NGO linkages were 
not common among the sample. Only Banco Wiese follows that practice in Peru while another, 
Banco Agricola Comercial in El Salvador, draws upon NGO guarantees to lend to some individual 
clienteles. 
Ninth, commercial banks benefited, in a number of cases, from donor-supported technical assistance 
that promoted the inception and identification of the appropriate lending technology in different 
settings. Technical assistance continues to provide guidance to a number of banks involved in 
microfinance, such as Centenary Bank in Uganda and Caja de Ahorro y Credito Los Andes in 
Bolivia. 
Tenth, recruitment of micro loan staff largely occurs from outside the bank. Furthermore, training 
new human resources is frequently undertaken with new staff recruited from local areas where bank 
branches offer microfinancial services. This allows credit officers close screening and monitoring 
of borrowers in their own environments, although in some African settings this practice has been 
altered to reduce the negative impact of strong kinship pressures on lending practices. Adequate 
remuneration of loan officers for their successful efforts, using performance-based bonuses 
dependent on the number and volume of loans and loan recovery record was also undertaken in the 
majority of banks issuing individual loans. 
In closing, it is clear that donor resources and the technical assistance networks accessed through 
these resources can play an important catalytic role in launching these programs and breaking down 
fears or resistance in bank circles to these initiatives. Second, it is also clear that this role can be 
fairly short-lived, as the bank's own deposit resources are brought into play, and the bank's 
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absorption of newly-recruited personnel and technological software packages give them the tools to 
carry on the promotion of these micro lending programs as a commercial platform. Although scale 
and scope economies are limited in the beginning as separate units and new personnel and credit 
technologies are added, frequently with some donor support, a period of self sufficiency is generally 
reached after three to four years of experience. 
II. Recommendations for the Donor Community 
To conclude this discussion it is instructive to review the possible role for the donor community in 
encouraging successful bank initiatives in microfinance. The key obstacles for microfinance in 
commercial banks, outlined in Chapter Two, can serve as a useful framework within which to review 
donor opportunities. 
A. Policy and Legal Environment 
In general donors should act as a friend in court on behalf of the micro finance community in their 
dialogue with government authorities. This positive role has three components. First, donors should 
argue for the elimination of all repressive financial regulations such as interest rate ceilings and un-
usually burdensome reserve requirements or detailed directed credit schemes. Microfinance can and 
should be able to emerge and compete in open niche markets as long as formal lenders in financial 
markets are free to charge interest rates that cover their operating costs, risks and the opportunity cost 
of :apital. 
Second, donors should encourage policy reform creating a prudential regulatory framework that 
recognizes the idiosyncratic features of institutions engaged in providing micro financial services. 
Third, donors can play a role in arguing for more rigorous contract enforcement institutions in the 
countries in which microfinance initiatives are operating. While a number of microfinance institu-
tions emphasize group loan products, many promote individual loans, especially the commercial 
bank community, and a few attempt to deal in both products. An effective contract enforcement 
environment is of vital importance to successfully issue and collect individual loans. The legal and 
juridical infrastructure is key here. Registry of liens is important as well as legal actions on 
postdated checks cashed with no back up funds. Given the modestly valued collateral typically used 
to secure individual microloans, excessive legal fees for court proceedings are inappropriate. Small 
claims courts in common law tradition could expedite contract enforcement proceedings in a cost-
effective manner. Ex-ante collateral technologies must have a proper ex-post contract enforcement 
environment to operate effectively. 
B. Commitment and Bank Culture 
Access to outside funds at interest rates below market levels has been the most popular mechanism 
employed by donors in the past to encourage already functioning banks to experiment with 
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microfinance programs. Normally, these have also been coupled with technical assistance of various 
degrees of intensity (from full-time resident advisors to training courses to observational trips). 
While cheap funds have helped encourage banks to enter the market, it is obvious that they alone 
are not enough to calm the fears of risk-averse bankers. Otherwise, there would be many more such 
programs. In most cases, commitment to microfinance among commercial bankers is more often 
explained by the vision of a strong leader within the bank. In other cases, commitment derives from 
an a priori understanding of the idiosyncracies of the target market, as in the case of the NGO 
transformations and the consumer and housing finance companies. 
Donors are best advised to have a tool box of various offerings, such as pilot loan funds, funds for 
start-up expenses, technical assistance, information seminars on the microfinance market, trips to 
successful programs, a mix of which could be provided depending on the nature of the institution's 
commitment and needs. 
Assuming interest extends beyond one or two banks in a particular country. an interesting alternative 
approach would be to offer funds to the highest bank bidder in an auction. Auctions could be held 
monthly beginning from an initial floor price which would change over time in relation to the trends 
in bidding transactions. This approach would be more transparent and introduce an element of 
market competition into the process of allocating resources for the market niches of microenterprise 
lending and take it out of the administrative control of a government or donor bureaucracy. The 
basic floor rate could initially reflect the interbank rate in the country in question with a portion of 
the total amount available put up for auction each month. In short, this approach is more consistent 
with the spirit of a market rather than an administrative allocation of resources directed to market 
niche lending. 
C. Organizational Structure 
The donor community is increasingly interested in discovering optimal tools for intervention to pro-
mote the expansion of financial services to the poor and near poor. More recently they have been 
exploring the avenue of APEX lending strategies where a second-level wholesale organization (the 
APEX) channels donor resources downstream through a network of independent retail institutions 
to service microenterprise borrowers. This strategy includes the possibility of working through 
commercial banks as well as retail level financial NGOs. Currently there are no rigorous studies 
establishing any proof that APEX strategies are the most cost effective strategy to reach low income 
clienteles with financial services. Arguments in favor of these strategies emphasize the alleged cost 
economies of channeling donor resources through wholesale units rather than attempting to reach 
downstream NGO organizations or banks directly. At the same time, allocation decisions to specific 
retail institutions would also be delegated to these APEX institutions. This strategy raises many 
questions that merit serious study that goes beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, the authors 
feel that whenever APEX strategies are used to disburse funds to downstream banks or financial 
NGOs, donors should make sure that the APEX organization does not attempt to alter the 
organizational or operational norms of the retail institutions. The APEX should not introduce 
distinct terms and conditions such as interest rate ceilings, special impact assessment reporting 
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requirements, or targeting criteria beyond the market niche itself. These interventions unnecessarily 
increase the transaction costs for downstream retail banks or microlending NGOs. These institutions 
should be free to set their own creditworthiness criteria and conduct their own evaluation of risk for 
their clienteles. 
To the extent that donors may be concerned about the rigor of the credit technology currently 
employed by these retail institutions or programs, they should consider technical assistance to 
improve these lending practices not selective credit criteria introduced from an APEX. Moreover 
this technical assistance should be provided through an independent third-party organization, not the 
APEX. There is an inherent conflict of interests in having technical assistance come from the same 
institution supplying the funds for on-lending. Finally, the APEX should carefully document the 
comparative repayment record of downstream institutions employing its funds. In this way the 
APEX could generate positive externalities for the donor community by acting as a credit rating 
agency for its downstream institutional borrowers. 
D. Financial Technologies, Human Capital Formation, and Productivity 
Enhancement 
The areas of technology, human resources, and productivity can be logically joined from the point 
of view of the role of the donor community. Human capital formation and the knowledge of 
innovative credit technologies that generate improved productivity in the supply of micro financial 
services have properties of a public good. The training and knowledge acquired by personnel in 
microfinancial institutions is disseminated widely as these trained employees move to other 
institutions and programs. Hence, social benefits are greater than private benefits as those 
institutions that did not invest in the training and knowledge generation nevertheless benefit from 
the spillover benefits from other institutions that did. In light of these positive economic 
externalities, subsidies may be legitimate. 
Donors can contribute substantially to the growth of microenterprise lending programs through 
continued support for the widespread transfer of financial technology. This can be accomplished 
through promotion of a clearing house role for documentation of best practice organizations and 
sponsorship of visits and internships in best practice programs for candidates from newly established 
programs. Continued support is justified for proven NGO organizations or specialized consulting 
firms, skilled in disseminating best practice financial technologies to commercial banks and 
microlending NGOs. These organizations can contribute substantially to human capital formation 
and the potential for cost conscious productivity growth in new start-up programs. The costs of the 
technical assistance should be shared between the banks or micro lending NGOs benefiting from this 
training and the donor community supporting these efforts. However, the share of the costs borne 
by the recipient bank or program should rise overtime to replace the donor share as user charges 
emerge as a market tested indicator of the success of incorporating best practice techniques. 
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E. Regulation and Supervision 
Microenterprise units or programs should be expected to report regularly on the number, volume and 
loan recovery status of their outstanding portfolios. Therefore, reasonably sophisticated information 
systems and associated software technology are required to track and report on these portfolios once 
they move beyond a rudimentary experimental stage. The major regulatory issue centers on the 
degree of additional reserves and provisioning that would be appropriate for institutions handling 
microenterprise loans. 
These regulatory issues manifest themselves differently in different institutional frameworks. Large 
private commercial banks with an established regulatory track record and a long history of operating 
from an ample deposit base are subject to much less risk than smaller and more specialized financial 
institutions, especially former microlending NGOs just launching their first deposit mobilization 
efforts. These larger banks typically make their own provisions for their microenterprise units. 
Since they have private owners with a strong interest in solvency and profits, one can assume that 
bank management will be watching the bottom line closely on their microlending programs given 
the opportunity cost of the bank's capital and deposits devoted to these programs. It would not 
appear necessary for regulatory authorities to introduce additional provisioning or detailed reporting 
requirements for the programs in these banks beyond the standard reports on the number, volume 
and provisioning the banks themselves undertake for these activities. 
Former NGOs transformed into banks and smaller more specialized banks, in contrast, represent 
greater prudential risk. They have invariably been credit-only organizations and therefore are 
undertaking deposit taking for the first time when they purchase a bank franchise. Smaller and more 
specialized banks also represent greater risk, in this case, through the lack of a diversified portfolio 
dominated by a large share of small and microenterprise loans. Given the common risks of income 
shocks faced by their clientele groups, their interest earning revenue flows can experience greater 
volatility than those of a larger bank. To cover the risks inherent to these two types of institutions 
a higher capital adequacy standard should be considered than that used for the larger banks with 
microenterprise programs. 
The role of the donor community in the regulatory realm is necessarily limited but still important. 
The essential role here should be to encourage and support dialogue between banks administering 
microfinance facilities and regulators. Periodic seminars and workshops could be continued along 
the lines of a recent dialogue between former financial service NGOs, relevant donor representatives, 
and regulatory authorities in Bolivia. This exercise produced useful guidelines for the NGO 
community considering the step of becoming banks (see Rock and Otero 1997). A comparable effort 
should be considered in selected African countries where both the NGO financial services 
community, on the one hand, and regulatory authorities, on the other hand, need to explore common 
issues and problems in a far more fruitful fashion. The element of distrust and lack of knowledge 
and experience in both constituencies cries out for a friend in court to help shape the agenda for a 
more sensitive and serviceable interaction between these two groups. The donor community could 
play an important role in undertaking this role. 
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In conclusion, two institutional challenges remain in the continuing evolution of these programs in 
microfinance. The first is the search for the most cost-effective organizational form for large 
banking institutions to incorporate microfinance in an organization inherently ill-suited to adapt to 
the cultural world of these clienteles. The second is the most appropriate governance structure for 
former financial service NGOs evolving into banks. In the former case integrated, separate or hybrid 
forms of organization are emerging through trial and error within different commercial banks in the 
developing world. In the latter case rapidly maturing microlending NGOs are experimenting with 
several forms of donor-sponsored capital share ownership arrangements in an attempt to find an 
acceptable substitute for conventional private owners. These novel ownership and governance 
structures are designed to maintain a commitment to the target group of microenterprise clienteles. 
For the institutions in this study these governance structures are still in an embryonic stage and have 
not stood the test of time. How these two institutional challenges work themselves out will play an 
instrumental role in shaping the future of microfinance in the commercial banking world. 
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